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U.N. Security Council Permanent Membership: A 
New Proposal for a Twenty-First Century Council 
Michael J. Kelly* 
It goes without saying that all of us agree on the need to reform and 
enlarge the Security Council in all respects, in order for this vital 
United Nations organ to reflect the changes of the modern world . . . .  
The difficulty is in deciding how this should be brought about . . . .   
Collective human ingenuity created the United Nations in 1945.  That 
ingenuity is still here and better informed than ever before.  What is 
lacking today is political will.1 
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INTRODUCTION 
The United Nations was born during a time of turmoil.2  The 
fields, villages, and great cities of Europe were still smoldering.  The 
wrecked hulls of sunken warships in the Atlantic and Pacific were 
just beginning to rust.  The charred remains of tank battalions were 
not yet covered by the desert sands of the Sahara.  Civil war in 
China had broken out before the previous war’s dead could be 
buried.  Terrified millions cowered before bitter, and sometimes 
brutal, occupying forces.  The reality of the Holocaust was still being 
uncovered.  Millions of refugees and displaced survivors were on 
the move all over the globe. 
Forged by the victors of the Second World War, in the 
aftermath of the most destructive global conflict in history—the only 
one to witness the aggressive use of nuclear weapons—the new 
United Nations was charged with bringing order to a climate of 
political and social chaos.3  Stability was sought through the 
insurance of international peace and security.  The Charter of the 
United Nations, adopted in San Francisco in 1945, placed the Allied 
nations at the helm of the Security Council.4  Pursuant to the 
Charter, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, France, the United States, 
and the Republic of China were each granted “permanent” seats on 
this august body, as well as complete individual veto power5 over 
any proposed action. 
Ironically, the very structure that was meant to ensure strong 
leadership by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) turned 
out to be its key weakness and the chief cause of paralysis during 
the ensuing Cold War.6  The only major military action conducted 
 
 2 LELAND M. GOODRICH & EDVARD HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 
COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 3 (1946). 
 3 LELAND M. GOODRICH, THE UNITED NATIONS 41 (1959). 
 4 OXFORD COMPANION TO POLITICS OF THE WORLD 932 (Joel Krieger ed., 1993) 
[hereinafter POLITICS OF THE WORLD].  The U.N. essentially “emerged from the anti-
Axis coalition.”  Id.  Fifty nations adopted the Charter on June 26, 1945, allowing it 
to enter into force on October 24 of the same year.  Id. 
 5 U.N. CHARTER, arts. 23 & 27.  See also Keith L. Sellen, The United Nations 
Security Council Veto in the New World Order, 138 MIL. L. REV. 187, 190 (1992) (citing 
INIS L. CLAUDE,  JR. ,  SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES—THE PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS OF 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 61-62, 155 (4th ed. 1971) (noting U.S. fears that the 
Senate would not ratify the treaty without the veto and Soviet fears that it would be 
consistently outvoted by the Western powers without the veto)). 
 6 POLITICS OF THE WORLD, supra note 4, at 933.  Inaction by the Security Council 
was due largely to the presence of the veto.  By the end of 1989, the U.S.S.R. had 
vetoed 114 resolutions and the U.S. had vetoed 67.  Id.  By comparison, the U.K. had 
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pursuant to UNSC authorization between 1950 and 1990 was the 
Korean War.7  That this action was undertaken without veto was 
due entirely to circumstance—the Soviet seat was vacant and the 
Chinese seat was in dispute.8  The only major U.N. military action to 
take place since the end of the Cold War was the Gulf War against 
Iraq.  That this action was undertaken without veto was due entirely 
to politics—the Soviet Union had dissolved, Russia was financially 
indebted to the West, and China had been co-opted by the United 
States.9  Thus, because Russia sought aid from the West and China 
sought to mollify negative American public opinion following the 
1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, neither country vetoed U.N. 
military action in the Persian Gulf.10 
Recently, calls by the 180 other countries not included in the 
“permanent” structure of the Security Council to reform the UNSC 
by increasing its diversity have grown more specific and more 
insistent.11  However, there are understandable fears that an increase 
in the number of permanent members on the UNSC with more veto-
wielding authority would undermine the Council’s newfound 
efficiency and effectiveness.12  Thus, no agreement has been reached 
in seven years of negotiation.13 
This article presents a new proposal for reforming UNSC 
permanent membership derived from state, organizational, and 
academic recommendations, which have been reinterpreted into a 
new framework, infused with new modifications and extrapolated 
to achieve a new consensus on Security Council restructuring.14 
 
vetoed thirty measures, France eighteen, and China three during the same period.  
Id. 
 7 “The Cold War effectively prevented the Security Council from acting under 
chapter VII except to counteract apartheid and the vestiges of colonialism.”  
Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., The Security Council’s First Fifty Years, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 506, 
512 (1995). 
 8 See infra notes 20-23 and accompanying text. 
 9 David D. Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security 
Council, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 552, 563 (1993) (citing Burns H. Weston, Security Council 
Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision Making: Precarious Legitimacy, 85 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 516, 523-25 (1991)).  See also discussion infra note 209. 
 10 WENDELL GORDON, THE UNITED NATIONS AT THE CROSSROADS OF REFORM 34 
(1994). 
 11 BARDO FASSBENDER, UN SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM AND THE RIGHT OF VETO: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 237 (1998). 
 12 Michael Binyon, Pretenders to U.N. Throne Cause Rift Among Old Powers, TIMES 
(London), June 3, 1993, available at 1993 WL 10582172. 
 13 Press Release, United Nations, General Assembly Concludes Consideration of 
Security Council Reform GA/9693 (Dec. 20, 1999). 
 14 While the ancillary reform issue of increasing UNSC transparency in its 
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I.  PAST SECURITY COUNCIL MILITARY ACTIONS: KOREA & IRAQ 
Prior to undertaking any reform analysis, it is instructional to 
place UNSC politics and history in perspective by noting when the 
Council has and has not acted to exercise its greatest power—the 
authorization for the use of force.15  The multinational military 
coalitions formed under U.N. mandate and led by the United States 
in Korea and Iraq are the two major examples of collective security 
in action.16  It is no coincidence that they served as “bookends” on 
either side of the Cold War, an era characterized by inaction by the 
UNSC through liberal veto usage.17 
Prior to the outbreak of the Cold War, the Korean Peninsula 
was divided for postwar occupation by agreement between the 
United States and the U.S.S.R. in August of 1945;18 however, as in 
Europe, communist forces did not relinquish their grip on their 
portion of the occupied territories.19  As for the Chinese Civil War, 
with Mao Zedong’s victory over Chiang Kai-shek in 1949, 
communist control over mainland China was solidified,20 causing 
the nationalist Chinese forces to flee across the Taiwan straits to the 
island of Formosa.21  Fresh from this momentous victory, the 
 
conduct of regular business is an equally important and philosophically vexing 
concern, it is beyond the focus of this study.  Closed door diplomacy has emerged 
as the modus operandi for the Security Council, such that before the Council meets in 
public session, the five permanent members have already met in a separate room, 
and the three permanent members that belong to NATO  (U.S., France and Britain) 
have already consulted.  These prior meetings are closed, and no minutes recorded.  
W. Michael Reisman, The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 
83, 85-86 (1993).  The Open-Ended Working Group is charged with considering the 
issues of UNSC expansion and increased transparency together. 
 15 U.N. CHARTER, ch. VII; Kirgis, supra note 7, at 511-13. 
 16 Robert S. Snyder, Reforming the Security Council for the Post-Cold War World, 14 
INT’L J. ON WORLD PEACE 3, 5-6 (1997). 
 17 Id. at 5. 
 18 WILLIAM STUECK, THE KOREAN WAR: AN INTERNATIONAL HISTORY 18-19 (1995).  
It was the U.S. that proposed division of the American and Soviet occupation zones 
at the 38th parallel.  Id. at 19.  Stalin accepted this proposal, as it gave the Soviets 
access to warm water ports as well as hydroelectric power grids.  Id.  However, 
two-thirds of the population remained in the American-occupied southern sector.  
Id. 
 19 When the U.S. withdrew its “occupation” forces from South Korea in 1949, id. 
at 28, it left behind a democratic government in South Korea, while the communist 
troops withdrawing left behind a puppet government in North Korea that was in 
control of a Sino-Soviet trained and equipped military poised to invade the South.  
MYUNG-KI KIM, THE KOREAN WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 37-47 (1991). 
 20 SERGEI N. GONCHAROV, ET AL., UNCERTAIN PARTNERS: STALIN, MAO, AND THE 
KOREAN WAR 1-35 (1993). 
 21 Id. 
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communist Chinese leadership backed the puppet government in 
communist North Korea in its decision, conceived with Soviet 
approval, to conquer the entire Korean Peninsula.22  America acted 
in response to this communist incursion by taking the matter to the 
UNSC, where only three of the five permanent members were 
actively seated. 
The Chinese seat was still occupied by the nationalist Chinese 
government—recently exiled to Taiwan after their defeat on the 
continent by the Communists.23  The Soviets boycotted the UNSC as 
an official protest to support the seating of the communist 
government of the People’s Republic of China over the 
nationalists.24  Predictably, France and the United Kingdom declined 
to veto the American initiative, and the UNSC issued Resolution 83, 
authorizing military resistance to the North Korean incursion,25 and 
Resolution 84, approving a unified command for this operation 
under American leadership.26  Subsequently, a multinational 
coalition of sixteen nations was formed27 with the bulk of troops 
from the United States28 and, under the command of General 
Douglas MacArthur, sent to repel the North Korean communist 
invasion.29 
Politically, U.N. authorization of this military action meant that 
the objective was restoration of South Korea’s territorial integrity, 
not the occupation of North Korea.30  Resistance to this limitation 
ultimately contributed to the loss of General MacArthur’s command 
when he demanded authority from President Truman to complete 
 
 22 Id. at 143-54. 
 23 SYDNEY D. BAILEY & SAM DAWS, THE PROCEDURE OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 
179-81 (3d ed. 1998). 
 24 POLITICS OF THE WORLD, supra note 4, at 933.  See also BAILEY, supra note 23, at 
181, 257.  The absence of the Soviet representative due to its boycott was considered 
a voluntary abstention.  Id. 
 25 S.C. Res. 83, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., 474th mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. S/1511 (1950); 
POLITICS OF THE WORLD, supra note 4, at 933.  The vote was seven (Republic of China, 
Cuba, Ecuador, France, Norway, United Kingdom, United States) to one 
(Yugoslavia).  Egypt and India did not participate. 
 26 S.C. Res. 84, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., 476th mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. S/1588 (1950); 
POLITICS OF THE WORLD, supra note 4, at 933.  The vote was seven (Republic of China, 
Cuba, Ecudaor, France, Norway, United Kingdom, United States) to none (Egypt, 
India and Yugoslavia abstaining). 
 27 DAVID J. WHITTAKER, UNITED NATIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 50 (1997). 
 28 Id.  The U.S. provided “half the troops, 86 percent of the naval force and 90 
percent of the air force.”  Id. 
 29 STUECK, supra note 18, at 85-87. 
 30 PETER R. BAEHR & LEON GORDENKER, THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE 1990S 67 (2d 
ed. 1994). 
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the conquest of North Korea and drive onward across the Yalu 
River into mainland China.31  Truman, who understood this political 
limitation as well as the consequences of invading China, declined 
such authorization and dismissed the publicly insubordinate 
general.32 
Resolution of the Korean War centered on the establishment of 
a demilitarized zone33 between communist North Korea and 
democratic South Korea at the 38th parallel.34  This border still 
divides the two countries on the Korean Peninsula, although 
tensions have begun to mount once more.35  Today, 37,000 U.S. 
troops continue to be garrisoned in South Korea36 as part of a U.N. 
force.37  Because peace negotiations were never produced a formal 
treaty, a state of war technically still exists between North and South 
Korea.38 
Throughout the Cold War, the allocation of the Security 
Council’s permanent seats between three democratic/capitalist 
states (the United States, Britain, and France) and two communist 
states (the U.S.S.R. and the People’s Republic of China, which 
gained the disputed Chinese seat in 197139), ensured that no military 
action would be mounted under the U.N. banner that involved any 
conflict of interest between the two camps.40  Consequently, it was 
only after the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. and the resultant 
 
 31 STUECK, supra note 18, at 62, 66, 130-35. 
 32 Id. at 178-82.  MacArthur nonetheless returned home to a hero’s welcome.  
JAMES L. STOKESBURY, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE KOREAN WAR 127 (1988). 
 33 The U.N. has subsequently used demilitarized zones (DMZs) in other places, 
such as the border between Iraq and Kuwait and the Prevlaka Peninsula, disputed 
by Croatia and Yugoslavia. 
 34 Marcelle S. Fischler, Long Island Journal: A Mission to Teach about a Forgotten 
War, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2000, at LI4. 
 35 Howard W. French, Strains with North Korea Ease, but Clouds Hover, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 7, 1999, at A6; Calvin Sims, Behind Korea Meeting, A Million Troops in a 
Standoff, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2000, at A3.  Even so, there is hope that progress will be 
made toward closer ties leading to eventual reunification some years down the 
road. The Two Koreas Continue to Report Progress in New Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 
2000, at A6. 
 36 Sheryl WuDunn, 2 Koreas’ Navy Vessels Circle Cautiously; U.S. Sends Ships, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 18, 1999, at A3. 
 37 Steven Erlanger, Peace Is Up to North Korea, Albright Tells Front-Line Troops, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1997, at A10. 
 38 Fischler, supra note 34. 
 39 BAILEY, supra note 23, 184-87. 
 40 Sean D. Murphy, The Security Council, Legitimacy, and the Concept of Collective 
Security after the Cold War, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 201, 207 (1994). 
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conversion of Russia, successor to the Soviet UNSC seat,41 to a 
pluralistic capitalist democracy, that a majority of permanent 
Security Council members was able to politically neutralize 
communist China (undergoing its own post-Mao economic 
reforms).42  These developments also allowed the UNSC to move 
forward with a military response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.43 
On the morning of August 2, 1990, about 120,000 Iraqi troops, 
led by over 350 battle tanks, swarmed across the border into the 
sheikdom of Kuwait, seizing the small country’s oil fields and 
occupying its capital.44  The government was driven into exile.45  In 
response, the UNSC passed a series of resolutions condemning the 
invasion, demanding a withdrawal,46 and imposing economic 
sanctions against Iraq for non-compliance.47 The UNSC also 
authorized military action to intercept maritime trade in violation of 
previous resolutions,48 demanded the protection of all diplomats in 
the occupied areas,49 threatened additional action against Iraq for 
continued non-compliance,50 condemned Iraqi attempts to 
repopulate Kuwait with Iraqi nationals,51 and finally, authorized the 
use of military action to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait.52 
Led once again by the United States, a multinational coalition 
of twenty-one nations was formed to militarily intervene and 
 
 41 Id. at 137; Michelle Smith, Note, Expanding Permanent Membership in the U.N. 
Security Council: Opening a Pandora’s Box or Needed Change?, 12 DICK. J. INT’L L. 173, 
188 (1993). 
 42 GORDON, supra note 10. 
 43 POLITICS OF THE WORLD, supra note 4, at 934. 
 44 Christopher John Sabec, Note, The Security Council Comes of Age: An Analysis 
of the International Legal Response to the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, 21 GA. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 63, 64-65 (1991). 
 45 Id. 
 46 S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932d mtg. at 19, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 
(1990). 
 47 S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2933d mtg. at 19, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 
(1990). 
 48 S.C. Res. 665, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2938th mtg. at 21, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 
(1990). 
 49 S.C. Res. 667, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2940th mtg. at 23, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 
(1990). 
 50 S.C. Res. 674, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2951st mtg. at 25, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 
(1990). 
 51 S.C. Res. 677, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2962d mtg. at 27, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 
(1990). 
 52 S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg. at 27, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 
(1990).  The vote was twelve (Britain, Canada, Columbia, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, 
Finland, France, Malaysia, Romania, Russia, United States, and Zaire) to two (Cuba 
and Yemen).  China abstained. 
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liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation.53  As in the case of Korea, 
U.N. involvement meant that political limitations were necessary.  
Security Council authorization did not include the occupation of 
Iraq, only restoration of the territorial integrity of Kuwait.54  
Consequently, President George Bush ordered General Norman 
Schwarzkopf to halt the Gulf War once this goal was achieved.  
Since 1991, the UNSC has demonstrated more willingness to 
authorize military intervention around the world in furtherance of 
its mandate to ensure international peace and security. 
Indeed, it is generally the British view that successful 
multinational U.N. military interventions like those in Korea and 
Iraq indicate that the UNSC can work as designed;55 only the 
happenstance of the Cold War stymied these efforts for forty years.  
The sixteen nations comprising the Korean War coalition 
represented about twenty-six percent of U.N. member states in 1950, 
and the twenty-one nations comprising the Gulf War coalition 
represented approximately thirteen percent of U.N. member states 
in 1990.56  Consequently, the argument goes, whether the world 
community represented in the U.N. consists of 62 states, as it did in 
1950,57 or 159 states, as it did in 1990,58 the UNSC can still respond 
militarily, effectively and efficiently.  Therefore, any significant 
increase in the membership of the UNSC would negatively affect 
both its “efficiency and effectiveness.”59 
 
 53 WHITTAKER, supra note 27, at 50.  Of the 680,000 troops fielded by the coalition 
during the Gulf War, two-thirds were American.  Id. 
 54 See S.C. Res. 678, supra note 52. 
 55 Michael Sheridan, United Nations: What’s Gone Wrong? / Chaotic Harmony or 
Just Chaos?; Structural Defects, INDEPENDENT (London), Nov. 1, 1993, at 14. 
 56 KUMIKO MATSUURA ET AL., CHRONOLOGY AND FACTBOOK OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS 1941-1991 227-32, tbl. 1 (1992). 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 FASSBENDER, supra note 11, at 235-37.  Not all states, however, share this view.  
Lithuania’s ambassador to the U.N. recently stated: 
[T]he dilemma of the Security Council’s enlargement had been 
presented as one of equitable representation versus efficiency.  Such a 
characterization was wrong; there was no contradiction between 
representatively and efficiency.  On the contrary, the correlation 
between the two was positive.  Proper enlargement of the Security 
Council would enhance its efficiency. 
Press Release, United Nations, Assembly Adopts Text on Bosnia and Herzegovina; 
Takes Up Security Council Reform GA/9688 (Dec. 16, 1999). 
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II.  THE STRUCTURE OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL 
Organizationally, little has changed since the first meeting of 
the Security Council60 on January 17, 1946 at Church House, 
London, “close to Westminster Abbey and the bomb-scarred Houses 
of Parliament.”61  In addition to the original five permanent 
members, six non-permanent members were elected by the General 
Assembly: Australia, Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, the Netherlands, and 
Poland.62  Two days later, Iran brought the first dispute to the new 
body, contesting the presence of Soviet troops in its territory.63 
An informal “gentlemen’s agreement” reached prior to the first 
meeting provided that non-permanent seats would be 
geographically distributed on the following basis:64 
 
Region Permanent Seats 
Latin America Two 
Middle East One 
Eastern Europe One 
Western Europe One 
Commonwealth One 
 
This pattern was basically followed with varying degrees of 
success until 1963, when the General Assembly decided to enlarge 
the non-permanent seats on the Security Council from six to ten.65  
Reflecting the appearance of new states during the period of 
decolonization, the geographic distribution of non-permanent seats 
was reallocated:66 
 
Region Permanent Seats 
African States Three 
Asian States Two 
Latin American States Two 
Eastern European States One 
Other States Two 
 
 60 Kirgis, supra note 7, at 537. 
 61 BAILEY, supra note 23, at 1. 
 62 Id. 
 63 MATSUURA, supra note 56, at 4. 
 64 BAILEY, supra note 23, at 143. 
 65 Id. at 152. 
 66 Id. at 152-53. 
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The 1963 accommodation reflects the current structure of the 
Council:67 fifteen members total, five of whom are permanent with 
an individual veto power68 and ten of whom are non-permanent, 
elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms with no 
individual veto power.69  Five of the ten non-permanent members 
are elected each year to provide overlap.70  Moreover, none are 
allowed to serve consecutive terms.71 
The UNSC voting structure restrains the five permanent 
members from doing whatever they choose.  Any Council action 
requires the concurring votes of at least four of the non-permanent 
members.72  Additionally, while the non-permanent members have 
no individual veto prerogative, they can exercise a collective veto of 
sorts.  When any five of the non-permanent members are in 
agreement, they can prevent the Council from taking an action by 
exercising an open or hidden veto.73 
Significant geographic concerns, and to a lesser extent numeric 
representation, were adequately addressed by the 1963 enlargement.  
Due to ongoing de-colonization and the break-up of the Soviet 
Union, however, the number of U.N. member states has grown 
exponentially since that time.  Over a thirty-year period, U.N. 
 
 67 India raised the question of increasing the number of non-permanent UNSC 
members from ten to fourteen in 1979, but this proposal was not seriously 
considered.  M.H. Ansari, Democratizing the Security Council, in THE UNITED NATIONS 
AT 50: AN INDIAN VIEW 205, 207 (Satish Kumar ed., 1995). 
 68 BAILEY, supra note 23, at 137.  The veto of a permanent member may be 
exercised in several ways including (1) The Open Veto (or Real Veto), where any 
negative vote on any substantive matter is an open veto, (2) The Double Veto, 
where disagreement arises over whether a proposal submitted to the UNSC is 
procedural or substantive in nature, and the permanent member uses its veto to 
prevent the matter from being considered procedural and then use its veto again to 
defeat the proposal itself, (3) The Hidden Veto (or Indirect Veto), which may be 
used instead of an outright veto when a permanent member persuades a majority 
of UNSC members to abstain on a question or vote against it, thereby defeating the 
matter all the same, (4) The Imposed (or Artificial Veto), or an attempt by a 
permanent member to make its consent essential for “‘questions which naturally 
should be solved . . . on a majority basis’”, and (5) The Veto by Proxy, where a 
permanent member exercises its veto power on behalf of a non-permanent member 
state or a state not sitting on the UNSC.  ANJALI V. PATIL, THE U.N. VETO IN WORLD 
AFFAIRS 1946-1990 16-17 (1992). 
 69 BAILEY, supra note 23, at 152-53.   
 70 Id. at 142.   
 71 Id.; U.N. CHARTER, art. 23, para. 2. 
 72 BAILEY, supra note 23, at 139. 
 73 Id.  See also supra note 68. 
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membership grew from 115 in 1964 to 185 in 1994.74  Today there are 
180 candidates to fill only ten elected seats on the Security Council.75  
As a result, the question of equitable representation through further 
enlargement of the Security Council is now widely regarded as ripe 
for consideration.76 
III.  AN OVERVIEW OF REFORM PROPOSALS 
Proposals for Security Council reform, beginning in 1979 and 
continuing through the 1980s, were geared mainly toward 
increasing diversity and numeric representation for non-permanent 
members.77  However, after the end of the Cold War, which held the 
UNSC in de facto status quo, proposals began to surface that 
reflected a more widespread sentiment to overhaul the UNSC.78  
From 1991 to 1993, the general feeling of “Third World” nations 
grew into a majority opinion on the matter and culminated in the 
passage of General Assembly Resolution 47/62, entitled Question of 
Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the 
Security Council.79 
This, in turn, led to the adoption in the next session of 
Resolution 48/26, establishing an “Open-ended Working Group to 
consider all aspects of the question of an increase in the membership 
of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council.”80  
While the Working Group began meeting in 1994 under the 
chairmanship of Guyana,81 discord among the participants 
hampered the group from making any concrete proposals.  
Although there was general agreement that reform should be 
 
 74 Id. at 153. 
 75 Id.  Because of the prestige associated with service on the now-active Security 
Council, competition among eligible candidate member states for election to the 
non-permanent regional seats has sometimes become expensive, fierce and 
bordering on the unethical.  See Barbara Crossette, Road to Seat at the U.N. is Paved 
with Perks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1998, at A4 (noting the exchange of expensive gifts, 
complimentary cruises, free trips to candidate countries, and brown envelopes left 
in hotel rooms during junkets); David Watts, Seoul Offers Peace Troops for Seat on 
Security Council, TIMES (London), Mar. 8, 1995, available at 1995 WL 7653656. 
 76 Sam Daws, The Reform of the U.N. Security Council: Introduction, in DOCUMENTS 
ON REFORM OF THE UNITED NATIONS 415 (Paul Taylor et al. eds., 1997). 
 77 These efforts were actively suppressed by Britain, France, the U.S. and the 
U.S.S.R.  FASSBENDER, supra note 11, at 221-22. 
 78 Id. at 222-25. 
 79 Id. at 225 (citing U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/62). 
 80 Id. at 225-26. 
 81 Id. at 228. 
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undertaken,82 the major overarching proposal offered by Malaysia 
during its chairmanship of the Working Group in 1997 was met with 
a mixed reception.83 
Beyond the question of seating new members, significant 
disagreement remains among states over whether new permanent 
members should also be granted veto power.84  Such vexing issues 
emanate from the constitution builder’s conundrum articulated by 
Yale Law School Professor W. Michael Reisman: “Too much 
centralized power will mean abuse; too much control will mean 
paralysis.  Too much decentralization and too little control could 
spell anarchy.”85 
The following are brief descriptions of various reform 
proposals for permanent membership seat distribution, and veto 
power, in the U.N. Security Council.  Reconfiguration and 
redistribution of non-permanent seats is only cursorily considered 
as a method to gain acceptance of these proposals.86  As the reader 
will note, there is a wide variety of ideas, but very little consensus 
for a specific, comprehensive UNSC reform plan.87 
A.  Recommendations from Member States 
As unavoidably self-interested creatures, recommendations 
from national governments will almost always contain a component 
 
 82 Id. at 231. 
 83 The Ambassador from Malaysia proposed a three-stage plan of reform, 
wherein during the first stage, the General Assembly would adopt a resolution to 
enlarge the UNSC by five permanent and four non-permanent seats.  FASSBENDER, 
supra note 11, at 233.  During the second stage, specific states would be selected to 
fill the permanent seats by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly.  Id.  During 
the third stage, the U.N. Charter would be amended in accordance with Article 108, 
followed by the convening of a review conference in ten years under Article 109 “in 
order to review the situation created by the entry into force of these amendments.”  
Id. (quoting U.N. Doc. A/AC.247/1997/CRP.1).  See also Press Release, United 
Nations, Assembly President Proposes Increase in Security Council Membership to 
24 by Adding 5 Permanent, 4 Non-Permanent Members GA/9228 (Mar. 20, 1997). 
 84 David M. Malone, The U.N. Security Council in the Post-Cold War World: 1987-
97, 28 SEC. DIALOGUE 393, 402 (1997).  See also Barbara Crossette, U.S., Bending a Bit, 
Will Offer Wider Role for 3d World at U.N., N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1997, at A14 (noting 
that while the U.S. insists that its own veto not be weakened, it is willing to turn 
over the decision on whether new UNSC members will receive a veto power to a 
committee). 
 85 W. Michael Reisman, Amending the U.N. Charter: The Art of the Feasible, 88 AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 108, 111 (1994). 
 86 See discussion infra section IV(C). 
 87 U.N. Press Release GA/SM/143, supra note 1.  General Assembly President 
Theo-Ben Gurirab noted in 1999 that “[m]ember States are not quite ready right 
now for concentrated negotiations and for the final package deal.”  Id.   
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that favors that nation’s foreign policy goals.88  Of course, this is to 
be expected, as the primary responsibility of any government is to 
protect the interests of its own citizenry.  Nevertheless, several 
proposals for UNSC reform offered by states do present creative 
suggestions.  Moreover, they deserve consideration because only 
U.N. member states themselves can ultimately bring about any 
realistic reform within the U.N. 
As the sole remaining superpower and strongest permanent 
member of the UNSC, the United States89 has indicated, 
unequivocally, that any reform proposal that does not provide 
permanent seats for both Germany and Japan90 would be 
unacceptable.91  This position fulfills a campaign pledge by 
President Clinton92 made in recognition of their respective  
economic strengths and contributions to the U.N. budget, which are 
larger than the contributions made by current Security Council 
members Britain, France, and China.93  In addition to at least fifty 
other states, both Britain and France are also in favor of permanent 
seats for Germany and Japan.94 
While the United States understands that increasing permanent 
membership will result in some measurable dilution of its influence 
in the Security Council, it also clearly recognizes that without 
expansion the Council’s legitimacy,95 already questionable, will 
 
 88 Malone, supra note 84, at 403; Christopher S. Wren, Revising the U.N. Security 
Council: All Agree They Don’t Agree, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1995, at A9; Helen Leigh-
Phippard, Remaking the Security Council: The Options, in DOCUMENTS ON REFORM OF 
THE UNITED NATIONS 421 (Paul Taylor et al. eds., 1997). 
 89 GUY ARNOLD,  WORLD GOVERNMENT BY STEALTH, THE FUTURE OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS 156 (1997). 
 90 “[T]hough both [Germany and Japan] have GNPs in excess of one trillion 
dollars, that of Germany is nearly double Britain’s, while that of Japan, at nearly 
US$4.7 trillion, is second only to that of the United States and equivalent to the 
combined GNPs of Germany, France and Britain.”  Id. at 160. 
 91 Wren, supra note 88 (“[T]he United States has threatened to block whatever 
[proposal] does not give permanent membership to Germany and Japan.  ‘The 
United States could not agree to a Council enlargement that did not include their 
permanent membership.’”  (quoting American delegate Karl F. Inderfurth)). 
 92 FASSBENDER, supra note 11, at 237 n.243. 
 93 Paul Lewis, U.S. Says Bigger Security Council Will Make U.N. More Effective, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1994, at A8.  See also MATSUURA, supra note 56, at 227-32 tbl. 1 
(noting that the 1990 contributions for Germany were assessed at 8.93% of the U.N. 
budget, Japan at 12.45%, Britain at 5.02%, France at 6.0%, and China at 0.77%). 
 94 Press Release, United Nations, General Assembly Continues Discussion of 
Security Council Reform GA/9689 (Dec. 16, 1999); FASSBENDER, supra note 11, at 245. 
 95 For a recent discussion of perceptions regarding UNSC legitimacy and 
decision-making, see Obiora Chinedu Okafor, The Global Process of Legitimation and 
the Legitimacy of Global Governance, 14 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 117 (1997), and Jean-
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become more so.96  The United States has not articulated a view on 
whether Germany and Japan should be empowered with a veto 
prerogative.97  Nonetheless, it has said that it will not insist on 
revision of those countries’ constitutions to allow extensive 
participation in military peacekeeping operations around the 
world98 as a prerequisite to permanent membership on the Council. 
The United States’ view is that the permanent members of the 
UNSC should be expanded from five to ten.99  Germany and Japan 
should each be accorded their own individual permanent seats on 
the Council.100  The other three seats would then be distributed 
geographically among nations representing Latin America, Africa, 
and Asia.101  This plan basically reflects Germany’s “2+3” proposal 
that builds a Council of six developed, and four developing, 
permanent members.102  However, the German proposal goes a step 
further to meet the interests of those who are clearly not candidates 
for membership by proposing a periodic review mechanism for all 
new permanent and non-permanent UNSC members.103   
Politically, the United States acknowledges that the cost of 
securing permanent seats for Germany and Japan is to increase the 
 
Marie Henckaerts, Reporter, The Security Council: Its Authority and Legitimacy, 87 
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 300 (1993). 
 96 Lewis, supra note 93. 
 97 America’s only statement on the veto prerogative is that it would oppose any 
infringement on the powers of the current permanent members.  FASSBENDER, supra 
note 11, at 247. 
 98 Lewis, supra note 93.  See also FASSBENDER, supra note 11, at 242-43 (noting that 
while Japanese law now allows its Self-Defense Forces to participate in U.N. 
peacekeeping operations, it does not permit participation in Chapter VII military 
operations).  Moreover, while Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court removed 
legal obstacles to German military contributions to U.N. operations abroad in 1994, 
mustering significant domestic support for a substantial contribution remains 
problematic.  Id.   
 99 Barbara Crossette, U.S. Experts Suggest India Ease Military Presence in Kashmir, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1997, at A8. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. 
 102 FASSBENDER, supra note 11, at 241. 
 103 “New permanent members will become accountable to the general 
membership.  The performance and the action of any new permanent member will 
be taken into account at the moment of review.  Any new permanent member could 
be replaced.”  Id.  (quoting Periodic Review Clause: Working Paper by Germany, July 3, 
1996, U.N. Doc. A/AC.247/1996/ 
CRP.15/Rev.1).  In this regard, the philosophy behind a periodic review of 
permanent members is not altogether unlike the philosophy behind periodic post-
tenure review of university faculty.  Like permanent membership, a tenured 
professorship is considered a lifetime appointment.  The concept of review, 
however, is meant to ensure continuing high quality of work. 
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developing world’s non-permanent representation on the Council.104  
For a few years, an increase from fifteen to around twenty members 
was the maximum that the United States was willing to consider in 
this regard.105  Recently, however, the United States has indicated 
that expansion of the Council beyond twenty members might be 
acceptable in exchange for a long-sought reduction in its share of 
U.N. dues payments.106 
Italy has led the argument against this proposal107 on the theory 
that there should be no expansion of fixed permanent membership 
at all, only rotating regional permanent seats.108  In that regard, it 
appears to favor a seat for the European Union on the Council.109  
Italy also supports an idea put forward by Turkey that “semi-
permanent” seats should rotate frequently on a universal basis 
among a group of thirty to forty states instead of utilizing a strictly 
regional allocation scheme.110  However, the principle of universal 
suffrage for rotating seats has been rejected by the African states.111 
Interestingly, Chile, supported by Egypt and Ukraine, 
recommends a regional system for new permanent members, 
providing long-term service in the seat from a single country 
representing the interests of the region as a whole, but without veto 
 
 104 Lewis, supra note 93.  See also Crossette, supra note 84. 
 105 Crossette, supra note 84. 
 106 Barbara Crossette, U.S. Ready for Much Larger Security Council, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 4, 2000, at A4.  Currently, the U.S. is responsible for 25% of the U.N. operating 
budget. 
 107 See generally Gabriella Venturini, Italy and the United Nations: Membership, 
Contribution, and Proposals for Reform, 20 HAMLINE L. REV. 627 (1997). 
 108 U.N. Press Release GA/9688, supra note 59.  Statements by Francesco Fulci, 
the Italian Ambassador to the U.N., indicate that Italy’s motivation for this stance, 
at least in part, lies in its fear of marginalization were Germany to accede to its own 
permanent seat with full veto power.  See FASSBENDER, supra note 11, at 244-45. 
 109 U.N. Press Release GA/9688, supra note 59.  “In the debate before the 
Maastricht agreement in December 1991, a number of EC governments had 
demanded that Britain and France express readiness to give up their permanent 
council seats.  The Benelux countries, Italy, Spain and others argued that as the EC 
moved to greater political union, it should be represented by whichever member 
occupied the rotating presidency.”  John Palmer, EC Puts Its Weight Behind Security 
Council Revamp, GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 27, 1993, at 8; see also ARNOLD, supra note 
89, at 162. 
 110 FASSBENDER, supra note 11, at 259.  Turkey’s proposed criteria for selecting 
these countries include “population, geopolitical situation, military capacity, 
economic potential, ‘history of working within the Charter,’ record of contributions 
to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of 
the Organization, and equitable geographical distribution.”  Id.  (citing Reform of the 
Security Council: Position Paper of Turkey, Sept. 15, 1995, U.N. Doc. A/AC.247/5(l)). 
 111 Id. at 261. 
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power.112  Along these lines, Belize has proposed extending service 
in regional permanent seats to five years, with indefinite 
renewability, and elections of states to these seats “conducted under 
the auspices of the United Nations.”113  Of course, the merits of long-
term  
 
service, such as stability, reliability, and predictability, would be 
offset by a decrease in representational variety and opportunity to 
serve. 
Ethnicity has also come into play.  By demanding a permanent 
seat for Arab states, Syria114 has essentially put forth the idea of 
ethnically/culturally-based permanent seats instead of 
geographically-based seats.  While this is an interesting notion, one 
wonders how such seats would be apportioned.  Would they be 
distributed along the lines of “civilization” as delineated by 
Professor Huntington of Harvard’s controversial book, The Clash of 
Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order?115  If so, then there 
would be seats for each major culture he identifies: African, 
Buddhist, Eastern Orthodox, Hindu, Islamic, Japanese, Latin 
American, and Western Christian.116  It is more likely than not that 
the community of nations could not agree on ethnic divisions for 
representation on the UNSC.  Ethnicity and cultural identity have 
led to more fractious confrontations in the latter twentieth century 
than have geographic disputes.117 
 
 112 Id. at 256 & n.309. 
 113 Id. at 257. 
 114 Press Release, United Nations, General Assembly Continues Debate on 
Security Council Reform with Focus on Changing Veto, Permanent Membership 
GA/9692 (Dec. 20, 1999). 
 115 SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF 
WORLD ORDER (1996).  See also SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS?  
THE DEBATE (1993).  For a discussion of the debate surrounding Huntington’s 
theory, see THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS?  ASIAN RESPONSES (Salim Rashid ed., 1997). 
 116 See generally SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE 
REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER, supra note 115.  Note, if these were the divisions, then 
the Arab states would be in no better position to hold a permanent seat 
individually because instead of having to share a seat with either non-Arab African 
or Asian states under geographic representation, they would have to share a seat 
with non-Arab Islamic states under ethnic/cultural representation. 
 117 See generally Michael J. Kelly, Political Downsizing: The Re-Emergence of Self-
Determination, and the Movement Toward Smaller, Ethnically Homogenous States, 47 
DRAKE L. REV. 209 (1999). 
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B.  Recommendations from Organizations 
Although states are traditionally the only bodies with legal 
personhood recognized under international law,118 international 
organizations are gaining in both number and influence on the 
world stage.119  Consequently, as the activity level of 
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations increases 
dramatically, so too does the persuasiveness of their proposals. 
As for intergovernmental organizations, in 1994 the 
Organization for African Unity (OAU) unanimously adopted a 
model whereby they declared Africa to be entitled to two 
permanent seats on the UNSC that would “be occupied on a 
rotating basis according to criteria to be established by the OAU.”120  
The candidates would be designated by the regional organization 
and elected by the General Assembly.121  Seats would be occupied 
for between four and six years with the possibility of immediate 
reelection.122  In presenting the proposal, the Ambassador from 
Tunisia opined that both Latin America and Asia should receive two 
seats as well.123  Thus, under such a system, regional 
intergovernmental organizations would select how the seats are 
filled.124 
For instance, the OAU would fill the African seats and the 
Organization of American States (OAS) would fill the Latin 
 
 118 Id. at 275-76. 
 119 Jude L. Fernando & Alan W. Heston, The Role of NGO’s: Charity and 
Empowerment: Introduction: NGO’s Between States, Markets, and Civil Society, 554 
ANNALS AM.  ACAD. POL. & SOC.  SCI. 8, 8 (1997); Claudio Grossman & Daniel D. 
Bradlow, Are We Being Propelled Towards a People-Centered Transnational Legal Order?, 
9 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 18 (1993); Michael J. Kelly, Overcoming Obstacles to the 
Effective Implementation of International Environmental Agreements, 9 GEO. INT’L 
ENVTL. L. REV. 447, 485-87 (1997); see generally NGO’S,  THE U.N. AND GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE (Richard B. Bilder ed., 1996). 
 120 FASSBENDER, supra note 11, at 250 (citing Reformes des Nations Unies: Position 
Africaine Commune, OAU Doc. NY/OAU/POL/84/94 Rev. 2, Sept. 29, 1994).  This 
demand was reissued by the OAU in the 1997 Harare Declaration.  Id. at 251 n.254 
(citing Harare Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU 
on the Reform of the United Nations Security Council, June 4, 1997; U.N. Doc. 
A/AC.247/1997/CRP.11 (June 27, 1997)). 
 121 Id. at 257. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. at 250-51. 
 124 The concept of regional selection has been endorsed specifically by countries 
as diverse as Norway and Malaysia, id. at 258-59, and in principle by the United 
States.  Crossette, supra note 84.  With this emphasis on regional autonomy, the 
African states have rejected Turkey’s proposal of rotating seats elected on a 
universal basis. FASSBENDER, supra note 11, at 261. 
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American seats.  As interpreted by Belize, this would mean that 
“[t]he members of the group would be bound by the vote cast by the 
state representing them in a particular period of time.”125  While 
such a proposal has merit, it also has inherent flaws.  The problem 
for Asia is that it is so big that there is no one organization that 
includes most of the countries on the continent.  The most 
comprehensive grouping is the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN).126  Another difficulty is that because each 
regional organization may establish its own criteria, the criteria 
established for occupation of a seat may vary from region to region.  
Lack of uniform standards may result in an imbalance among the 
occupants of the regional seats. 
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have articulated a 
somewhat different view.  The Commission on Global Governance 
(CGG) developed a 1995 report that closely reflects the “2+3” plan 
endorsed by Germany and presented by Malaysia; however, it 
explicitly excludes the possibility of imbuing these new “standing 
members” with a veto prerogative.127  Moreover, it contends that the 
veto itself should fall into disuse through “a concordant among the 
five permanent members by which they agree that while retaining 
the veto, they would in practice forgo its use save in circumstances 
they consider exceptional and overriding in the context of their 
national security.”128  The CGG recommends simultaneously raising 
the number of non-permanent seats from ten to thirteen and also 
creating an Economic Security Council.129 
Along the lines of CGG’s “standing members” proposal, the 
 
 125 FASSBENDER, supra note 11, at 251 (citing DELEGATION OF BELIZE, SHARED SEATS 
ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL (Feb. 1, 1996)), reprinted in REPORT OF THE OPEN-ENDED 
WORKING GROUP ON THE QUESTION OF EQUITABLE REPRESENTATION ON AND INCREASE 
IN THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, ADDENDUM, ANNEX XV: PROPOSAL FOR 
REFORM OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL—BELIZE  (Working Paper, U.N. Doc. A/50/47, 64-
68 Sept. 9, 1996). 
 126 ASEAN is a ten nation political, economic and security association comprised 
of Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar (Burma), the 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.  Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations, Country Profiles, at http://www.asean.or.id (last visited Dec. 10, 2000). 
 127 FASSBENDER, supra note 11, at 256 n.308 (citing OUR GLOBAL NEIGHBOURHOOD: 
THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 240-41 (1995)). 
 128 COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, OUR GLOBAL NEIGHBOURHOOD: 
REFORMING THE UNITED NATIONS; THE SECURITY COUNCIL, available at 
http://www.cgg.ch/ 
unreform2.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 1999). 
 129 Id.   But see TOWARD GENUINE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, CRITICAL REACTIONS TO 
“OUR GLOBAL NEIGHBORHOOD” (Errol E. Harris & James Yunker eds., 1999). 
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United Nations Association—USA.130 has proposed the creation of 
four “semi-permanent” regional seats on the Council.131  Eight states 
would fill them, alternating within each region: Egypt/Nigeria for 
Africa; India/Japan for Asia; Brazil/Mexico for Latin America; and 
Germany/Italy for Europe.132  While this system is attractive, it is 
unlikely that the General Assembly would accept the creation of a 
third European seat on the UNSC (a fourth if Russia is considered 
European). 
C.  Recommendations from Academicians 
Scholars enjoy a status unique under international law in that 
their opinions are seen to carry great weight by the world 
community.  According to Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, the writings of “the most highly 
qualified publicists” can be considered as a subsidiary means for 
determining fundamental principles of international law.133  
Therefore, recommendations from academia should be considered 
along with those from states and organizations.  While some 
scholars believe the greatest difficulty encountered by efforts to 
reform the UNSC will center on the future role of the body in the 
maintenance of international peace and security,134 others believe 
that it is power allocation that will smother any efforts at 
restructuring.135  Professor Bruce Russett, Director of United Nations 
Studies at Yale University, has even constructed a method of 
measuring UNSC reform proposals characterized as a series of 
“balancing criteria” with which to evaluate proposals as they come 
 
 130 The UNA-USA is a policy research center, which focuses on the United 
Nations and global issues.  For a description of UNA-USA, see 
http://www.unausa.org (last visited Dec. 4, 2000). 
 131 FASSBENDER, supra note 11, at 256, n.309 (citing Chadwick F. Alger, Thinking 
About the Future of the U.N. System, in 2 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 335, 351 (1996)). 
 132 Id. 
 133 I.C.J. STATUTE, art. 38(1)(d). 
 134 David P. Fidler, Caught Between Traditions: The Security Council in Philosophical 
Conundrum, 17 MICH. J. INT’L L. 411, 451 (1996): 
Reforming, restructuring, and rejuvenating the Security Council for 
the next fifty years will prove difficult not only because of diplomatic 
obstacles but also because of the lack of consensus in liberal thought 
about the purpose and potential of the Security Council.  As a creation 
of liberal thinking, the Security Council ultimately succeeds or fails on 
the consensus that can be generated in liberal thought on the 
propriety of relying on an international organization to maintain 
international peace and security. 
Id. 
 135 ARNOLD, supra note 89, at 180-81. 
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forward.136  The following is a representative sampling of the range 
of reform proposals emanating from the academy. 
Dr. David Whittaker from the University of Teeside, Great 
Britain, recommends in his book on U.N. evolution that Security 
Council membership be enlarged to twenty or twenty-five, with 
seats for Brazil, the European Union, Germany, India, Japan, and 
Nigeria.137  Specifically, permanent membership should either be 
increased to ten seats or, alternatively, all UNSC members should be 
non-permanent and elected for two-year terms.138  Moreover, he 
would replace the veto with majority voting.139  Dr. Whittaker, 
however, is rightly pessimistic about the likelihood of such drastic 
reform because amendment of the Charter would be required,140 
and such amendments can be vetoed by any one of the current five 
permanent members.141 
Conversely, Dr. Robert Snyder of Southwestern University 
argues for the status quo.142  While he acknowledges that issues of 
both power and representation must be examined in the context of 
any reform, the Security Council “should continue to base itself 
primarily on power . . . .”143  On this premise, Dr. Snyder believes 
the UNSC should reflect U.S. hegemony.144  Under his power theory, 
 
 136 The ten self-explanatory “balances” offered to evaluate such proposals are as 
follows: (1) balance between the interests and perspectives of states and of broad-
based NGOs; (2) balance between the preservation and erosion of state sovereignty; 
(3) balance between practicality and vision; (4) balance between power 
(effectiveness) and legitimacy (justice); (5) balance between particularity and 
universality; (6) balance between civil/political rights and economic rights; (7) 
balance between enforcement and neutrality; (8) balance between specificity and 
plasticity of the Charter; (9) balance between uniformity and diversity of purpose; 
and (10) balance of interests.  Bruce Russett, Ten Balances for Weighing U.N. Reform 
Proposals, in THE ONCE AND FUTURE SECURITY COUNCIL 13-28 (Bruce Russett ed., 
1997). 
 137 WHITTAKER, supra note 27, at 104. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
 140 If the Charter were opened up for amendment, there are many items besides 
UNSC reconfiguration that would come quickly to the fore, opening a Pandora’s 
box of extraneous matters.  See generally Carolyn L. Willson, Changing the Charter: 
The United Nations Prepares for the Twenty-First Century, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 115 (1996). 
 141 WHITTAKER, supra note 27, at 105. 
 142 Snyder, supra note 16, at 15. 
 143 Id. at 7.  “The purpose of including only the big powers is that only they, and 
not the smaller powers, have sufficient interests and resources to handle security 
problems, and it is easier to muster ‘concerted’ action if only a small number of 
states are involved.”  Id. 
 144 Id. at 8.  Regarding American power reflected in the Council, Snyder notes 
the following: 
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both Russia and China keep their seats and Japan and Germany are 
welcomed into the UNSC.  He concludes, however, that it would be 
premature to allocate seats to such countries as India, Brazil or 
Indonesia because their power has not yet sufficiently developed.145  
Snyder also concludes that expansion should be kept to a minimum 
so as not to thwart efficiency.146 
Moreover, while Dr. Snyder is receptive to the idea of a 
consolidated seat for the European Union, he rejects the idea of 
permanent regional, rotating seats for the rest of the world.147  He 
accommodates the developing world by increasing its 
representation through six new non-permanent seats on the Council 
and eliminating the rule against service for consecutive terms.148  
Finally, on the question of veto prerogatives, Snyder defends the 
continued use of the veto power to ensure the adequate defense of 
permanent member national interests.149 
Inapposite to recommendations of formal Council 
reconfiguration that would result from amending the Charter, some 
scholars, such as Professor Ian Hurd from the University of 
Wisconsin, suggest that if states are truly interested in real reform 
beyond the window dressing of obtaining a UNSC seat, then 
informal membership and practice may be the preferred method of 
reconfiguration.150  Hurd refutes the assertion “that the Security 
 
The post-Cold War world illustrates that the United States’ 
hegemonic dominance had made the Security Council more effective . 
. . .  In an organization the structure of authority should reflect the 
structure of power . . . .  The United States is the only great power in 
the world.  To expand the permanent members of the council to 
include regional Third World states . . . would be giving states global 
authority without giving them global power.  As weak states with 
different interests than those of the United States, these Third World 
states would probably attempt to thwart U.S. initiatives, yet they 
would lack the power to implement alternative initiatives of their 
own.  The result would be the failure of the council to perform. 
Id. 
 145 Id. at 10. 
 146 Snyder, supra note 16, at 8. 
 147 Id. at 12.  The underlying theory is that while there are developing states that 
are emerging world powers, they are not yet sufficiently developed to undertake 
the tasks that would be required to make them effective permanent members of the 
UNSC. 
 148 Id. at 14. 
 149 Id. at 13.  “The veto serves as a needed brake on the actions that the Security 
Council might take that would be against the interests of one of the big powers, and 
it gives a desirable leadership role to the big powers as well.”  Id. 
 150 Ian Hurd, Security Council Reform: Informal Membership and Practice, in THE 
ONCE AND FUTURE SECURITY COUNCIL, supra note 136, at 135-52. 
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Council is ineffective because key states are not represented with 
permanent seats.”151 
Noting that both Germany and Japan already enjoy a 
remarkable degree of consultative access to at least three of the 
permanent members, Professor Hurd also identifies the states of the 
Non-Aligned Movement152  and states contributing troops to 
peacekeeping operations as exercising de facto informal membership 
on the Council.153  In this regard, Professor Hurd draws an 
important distinction between “participation” in Council decision-
making and “membership.”154  Consequently, as the creator of its 
own practices and rules of procedure, the UNSC could undergo 
quite  
significant informal change without resorting to a cumbersome and 
unpredictable Charter amendment process,155 while still achieving 
increased participation, legitimacy, and effectiveness.156 
Finally, Professors Russett, O’Neill, and Sutterlin of Yale 
University jointly propose a middle road whereby no new 
permanent members are formally created, yet all parties take away 
something.157  The authors recommend expanding the non-
permanent membership to sixteen, creating a Council of twenty-one, 
and abolishing the rule in Article 23(2) of the Charter against 
immediate re-election of nonpermanent members.158  This proposal 
is designed to accommodate Germany and Japan with regular 
presence on the UNSC without occupying seats that would 
normally go to other, smaller states.159 
 
 151 Id. at 137. 
 152 Soo Yeon Kim & Bruce Russett, The New Politics of Voting Alignments in the 
General Assembly, in THE ONCE AND FUTURE SECURITY COUNCIL, supra note 136, at 40 
tbl. 
 153 Id. at 136, 144-47. 
 154 Id. at 149.  This is related to Professor O’Neill’s theory of power and 
satisfaction on the UNSC, discussed infra note 188. 
 155 “Under Articles 28-32, the Security Council is the master of its own practices 
and procedures.  Even to the extent that its procedures are codified, . . . they can be 
altered by the Council as needed.”  Hurd, supra note 150, at 142.  For a discussion of 
other modifications that could be made without Charter amendment, see Louis B. 
Sohn, Comment, Important Improvements in the Functioning of the Principal Organs of 
the United Nations That Can Be Made Without Charter Revision, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 652 
(1997). 
 156 Hurd, supra note 150, at 142-47. 
 157 Bruce Russett et al., Breaking the Restructuring Logjam, in THE ONCE AND 
FUTURE SECURITY COUNCIL, supra note 136, at 153-69. 
 158 Id. at 167. 
 159 Id. 
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Moreover, the authors would increase the power of the non-
permanent members by raising the action threshold for passage of a 
resolution to thirteen or fourteen out of twenty-one UNSC members.  
This change thus compels the five permanent members to harness 
the assent of at least eight of the sixteen non-permanent members to 
achieve a winning coalition on a given measure.160  This would be 
coupled with the proposal offered earlier to restrict the veto’s usage 
to Chapter VII enforcement actions or other military matters and to 
repeal the “enemy states” clauses in the Charter.161  While the 
authors concede most of these recommendations are largely 
symbolic,162 it is sometimes the least ambitious platform that, when 
innocuously adopted, can lead in the long-term to more concrete 
subsequent alterations. 
D.  Recommendations for Veto Reform 
Several theories have been put forward to limit the potency of 
the traditional, substantive veto power.  Predictably, the first is its 
elimination altogether.163  Proposals to replace the veto with voting 
alternatives include use of the simple majority, the special majority 
(of the entire Council), the composite majority (a majority of both 
permanent and non-permanent members), and the double majority 
(a majority of the permanent members as well as of the entire 
Council).164  While such constructions are intellectually interesting, 
they are not viable because the permanent members are even less 
inclined to do away with the veto than reform it.165 
 Among the proposals to retain but restructure the veto are: (1) 
limiting the subject matter that can be vetoed;166 (2) doubling the 
veto requirement (requiring a second veto by another permanent 
member);167 and (3) overruling a veto if cast by a single permanent 
member.168  However, all of these recommendations are out of the 
question because the current five permanent members insist on 
 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. at 168. 
 162 Id. at 169. 
 163 Sellen, supra note 5, at 188. 
 164 Id. at 251.  For an in-depth discussion of each alternative see id. at 254-59. 
 165 Caron, supra note 9, at 567 (“Practically speaking, it is quite unlikely that the 
veto can be eliminated or even significantly limited.”).  See also id. at 570 (citing 
U.N. CHARTER, art. 108) (“Procedurally, the permanent members have a veto over 
any effort to take away their right of veto.”). 
 166 FASSBENDER, supra note 11, at 266. 
 167 Id. at 268. 
 168 Id. at 269. 
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preserving their unhindered right of veto.169  Nevertheless, the 
notion put forward by Germany that an explanation must 
accompany the casting of a veto170 might prove palatable to the 
permanent members and is worth consideration as it does not erode 
the effect of the substantive veto per se. 
For new permanent UNSC members, there is support for the 
proposition of not granting them a veto power at all, due to its 
undemocratic nature and potential for abuse.171  However, this is 
mitigated by the equally true observation that if the new permanent 
members do not receive a veto of some sort, then an imbalance is 
automatically created among the total permanent membership,172 
and, as the Philippine Ambassador said, “put[s] them on the same 
footing as non-permanent members.”173  Some states, such as Kenya, 
argue that if the veto is not to be eliminated, then “the privilege 
must be extended to all new members without discrimination.”174 
IV.  A NEW SECURITY COUNCIL STRUCTURE IS PROPOSED: THE 
FORMULA 
When the best elements of the above recommendations are 
synthesized as to permanent membership and modified as to veto 
power, the following structure emerges for a reformed Security 
Council.  This model realizes only a modest increase in membership, 
thereby preserving its “efficiency and effectiveness,” ameliorates the 
perceived hierarchy of developed versus developing states, limits 
the proliferation of veto  
 
 
possibilities, and increases the Council’s representativeness, thus 
further legitimizing its decisions: 
 
 
 169 Id. at 273-75.  Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, in her former capacity as 
the U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N., stated the matter clearly: “[B]ecause 
we have the veto at the Security Council, we can block any mission that is contrary 
to our interests, and I don’t need to assure you that our continued right to the veto 
is not negotiable.”  Id. at 273. 
 170 Germany Makes its Case for U.N. Security Council Seat, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 
Sept. 22, 1999, available at 1999 WL 25111142; U.N. Press Release GA/9689, supra 
note 94. 
 171 U.N. Press Release, GA/9228, supra note 83; U.N. Press Release, GA/9692, 
supra note 114. 
 172 U.N. Press Release, GA/9692, supra note 114. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Id. 
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Term and Veto Power Member 
Permanent Seats with 
Substantive Veto Power 
1.  China 
2.  Russia 
3.  United States 
Permanent Regional 
Rotating Two-Year Seats 




a.  France 
b.  Germany 
c.  United Kingdom 
Permanent Regional 
Rotating Two-Year Seats 
with Procedural Veto 
Power 
1.  Latin America 
a.  Brazil 
b.  Mexico 
c.  Argentina or Chile 
2.  Africa 
a.  South Africa 
b.  Egypt 
c.  Nigeria or Kenya 
3.  Asia 
a.  India 
b.  Japan 
c.  Indonesia or Pakistan 
 
Under this formula, the goal of diversity among UNSC 
permanent members is dramatically achieved on several levels: 
ethnic, cultural, religious, and geographic.  Moreover, power is 
preserved completely for three of the current five permanent 
members (China, Russia, and the United States) and partially, 
without diminution of the veto, for the other two (France and 
Britain).  Additionally, the new veto right granted to new 
permanent regional rotating members is less powerful than the 
traditional substantive veto, thereby assuring that new members 
accede to the Council with “a veto power,” but not one that would 
increase the number of substantive veto possibilities.  Indeed, the 
number of members that can exercise the substantive veto at any 
one time is reduced from five to four. 
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A.  Reconfiguration of the Veto Power 
The problem of veto proliferation175 that would likely result 
from an expansion of the Security Council is minimized under this 
author’s proposal to create a “procedural veto.”  The procedural 
veto is one by which the permanent members for Latin America, 
Africa and Asia may veto an item just as one of the other permanent 
members may do with its substantive veto.  However, when the 
procedural veto is cast (or the assent withheld, to use proper 
terminology), the matter is not automatically dead.  Instead, it is 
referred to a special session of the General Assembly for 
consideration.  A majority vote in the Assembly after brief debate, 
either for or against the matter without possibility of amendment, 
will then determine the matter’s future.176 
From a practical standpoint, the procedural veto then may 
become a substantive veto in some cases, especially on matters that 
directly affect developing countries—which are represented by the 
permanent regional rotating UNSC members who would be casting 
such a veto.  However, judicious use of such a power must be 
encouraged, just as it must with those who wield the substantive 
veto.177  Realistically, usage will rise and fall with whichever country 
happens to occupy the rotating seat for two years and whichever 
national interests happen to coincide with the thrust of the proposed 
action.  A corollary benefit of this device is that it handily meets the 
goal of increased involvement by the General Assembly.178 
Of the prospective permanent members, Germany, relying on 
an equal footing argument, has made it clear that it would require a 
substantive veto power if it were to accede to a Security Council 
 
 175 FASSBENDER, supra note 11, at 255. 
 176 Several methods for General Assembly consideration present themselves.  
The most democratic method would be for the entire assembly to vote on the 
resolution.  Alternatively, a special standing committee could be formed, 
representing a regional and developmental cross-section of perhaps twenty percent 
or twenty-five percent of the total members, that would vote on the resolution.  Of 
course such a committee would have to continually remain “in session” in New 
York during the period when the rest of the Assembly is in recess.  Finally, a hybrid 
approach could be adopted, whereby the whole Assembly would immediately take 
up the matter if it comes down while the Assembly is in session, but automatically 
refer it to the special standing committee if the resolution is presented for 
consideration while the Assembly is in recess. 
 177 Paul Lewis, U.N. Panel Proposes Expanding Security Council to 24 Members, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 21, 1997, at A13 (noting that the General Assembly President urges the 
permanent members to limit their use of the veto to Article VII issues). 
 178 Caron, supra note 9, at 575. 
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where such a power was wielded by France and the United 
Kingdom.179  Likewise, India would request “a veto,” but Japan 
would not require a substantive veto as a prerequisite to permanent 
Council membership.180  Conversely, there is agreement among 
Brazil, Pakistan,181 and Chile182 that the veto should eventually be 
eliminated, while Mexico and Myanmar propose that its use be 
curtailed only to questions of Chapter VII authority.183 
Under this paper’s proposal, the reality that the veto will 
continue to exist in some form is recognized.  The retention and 
collapse of substantive veto power into a European seat meets the 
stated requirement of substantive veto preservation for France and 
Britain184 and the equal footing requirement of Germany.  The 
creation of a procedural veto power in new permanent regional 
rotating members meets the dual goals of diluting the veto’s 
potency and according a heightened degree of status to new 
permanent members, such as India or Japan.185  Moreover, 
Germany’s proposal that an explanation accompany a veto 
whenever it is cast186 should be adopted and applied to both the 
substantive and procedural vetoes.187 
B.  Redistribution of Seats for Current and Prospective Permanent 
UNSC Members 
With any reconfiguration of the UNSC, there will be both 
positive and negative aspects for current and prospective permanent 
 
 179 FASSBENDER, supra note 11, at 261. 
 180 Id. at 261 n.325. 
 181 U.N. Press Release GA/9692, supra note 114. 
 182 U.N. Press Release GA/9693, supra note 13. 
 183 U.N. Press Release GA/9689, supra note 94. 
 184 Plausibly, France and Britain would look more favorably on sharing a single 
seat with Germany if their veto power remains intact.  However, such a move 
acknowledges their reduced status on the world stage.  “In the half-century since 
the Security Council was established, the permanent seats occupied by Britain and 
France have appeared increasingly anomalous . . . .”  Leigh-Phippard, supra note 88, 
at 420. 
 185 One of the concerns of potential new permanent members is that 
“withholding the veto for these new members would create a new category of 
membership still inferior in power and in standing to the original P-5.”  Malone, 
supra note 84, at 402.  Admittedly, a procedural veto is something less than a 
substantive veto; however, this proposal is in the nature of a compromise designed 
to bring together those states who oppose the extension of veto power on principle 
to new permanent members and those states who are in favor of its extension. 
 186 See discussion infra section III(D). 
 187 Such a rule could easily be incorporated into the Security Council’s 
Provisional Rules of Procedure. 
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members.  While some will gain status, others will lose it, either 
directly or through dilution by an increase in “the permanent 
club.”188  Assuming Luxembourg’s demand carries the day (that 
there be no loss of non-permanent seats to make room for new 
permanent seats)189 then the formula articulated above will meet this 
requirement because it results in retaining the current number of 
non-permanent seats.  This will yield a total of seventeen states 
serving on the UNSC at any one time (ten non-permanent members 
and seven permanent members—China, Russia, and the United 
States together with the four rotating regional seats).  A practical 
increase of only two seats would certainly allay the fears of 
unwieldiness and inefficiency that accompany discussions of 
expansion.190 
It is for practical reasons that the permanent regional seats must 
be filled on a rotating basis.191  No one state in any of the regions 
would be a completely acceptable representative for that region.192  
For instance, neither France nor Britain would defer to the other on 
filling the European seat.  Brazil, the economic and geopolitical 
power of Latin America,193 would not be supported by the other 
states in that predominately Spanish-influenced region, due 
primarily to its Portuguese heritage, language, and culture.194  India, 
a Hindu nation, the largest country besides China in Asia, a nuclear 
power and the logical choice to fill the Asian seat,195 would not be 
 
 188 For an analysis of power diffusion amongst UNSC members, see Table 1:  
Degrees of Power for Real and Hypothetical Security Councils, and accompanying 
text in Barry O’Neill, Power and Satisfaction in the United Nations Security Council, 40 
J. CONFLICT RESOL. 219, 223 (1996). 
 189 FASSBENDER, supra note 11, at 261. 
 190 Caron, supra note 9, at 555-56, 573-74, 576. 
 191 This aspect of the proposal most closely resembles Malaysian Ambassador 
Razali Ismail’s proposal to create permanent regional rotating seats for Latin 
America, Asia and Africa, but departs from his proposal to grant individual 
permanent seats to Germany and Japan.  Lewis, supra note 177 (“Mexico, Brazil and 
Argentina all want the Latin American seat; India, Pakistan and Indonesia are 
seeking the Asian seat; Nigeria, Egypt and South Africa all want the African seat.”). 
 192 “[I]t is the inability of the three regions [Latin America, Africa, and Asia] to 
agree on states that would represent them as permanent members which prevents 
developing countries from getting permanent seats.”  FASSBENDER, supra note 11, at 
247. 
 193 ARNOLD, supra note 89, at 163. 
 194 “It is no secret that the candidacy of Brazil is opposed by Latin American 
Spanish-speaking countries, in particular Argentina . . . . ”  FASSBENDER, supra note 
11, at 247; Barbara Crossette, Japan Asks for an End to Debate on U.N. Security 
Council’s Shape, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2000, at A15. 
 195 ARNOLD, supra note 89, at 162-63. 
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allowed to accede to the Security Council uncontested by Japan, the 
region’s economic superpower.  India’s presence on the UNSC 
would also likely be contested by Pakistan196 and Indonesia, the 
region’s largest Islamic nations—at least one of which is also an 
emerging nuclear power.197  Egypt and South Africa, the most 
mentioned candidates for an African seat,198 would present that 
region with an irreconcilable choice between Arab or Black 
representation. 
The rotating nature of the regional permanent seats therefore 
offers the best compromise to the question of who should occupy 
those seats, and the most efficient form of participation from diverse 
nations.  In fairness, it should be made clear that those countries 
selected to rotate through the permanent regional seats would not 
be allowed to also occupy a non-permanent regional rotating seat 
during the four-year period they are not filling the permanent 
seat.199  Possible nuances that could alter the above formula for 
increased variety in representation may include: (1) the selection of 
four instead of three states to rotate through each permanent 
regional seat; (2) the conversion of seat rotation from a two-year to a 
one-year commitment; or (3) the establishment of four regional 
security councils, composed of the states that rotate through the 
permanent regional seats and that consult with the occupier of each 
seat for that region when questions of Chapter VII use of force 
authorization arise. 
Although politically there must be a formalized General 
Assembly election process,200 the preliminary selection of key 
regional powers to fill the permanent regional rotating seats is based 
upon political reality.  Among the accepted criteria qualifying states 
to become permanent members are the country’s relative population 
within the region, financial contributions, adherence to U.N. 
principles, influence in world affairs, military capability, economic 
 
 196 FASSBENDER, supra note 11, at 247. 
 197 Celia W. Dugger & Barry Bearak, Falling Out; You’ve Got the Bomb.  So Do I.  
Now I Dare You to Fight., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2000, at D1. 
 198 FASSBENDER, supra note 11, at 247. 
 199 This mechanism would allow smaller countries more opportunity to occupy 
the existing non-permanent seats on the UNSC.  U.N. Assoc.–Canada, Roundtable on 
Security Council Reform, available at  
http://www.ncrb.unac.org/unreform/roundtables/ 
Screform.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2000) [hereinafter Roundtable]. 
 200 Selection of these new permanent members, however, is contingent upon 
their election by a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly.  Lewis, supra note 
93. 
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strength, democratic government, and willingness to enforce UNSC 
actions.201  Such criteria are open to subjective interpretation, and 
are mentioned throughout the following discussion that weighs the 
relative significance of permanent seat capture for each state and 
region. 
1.  China, Russia, and the United States 
Obviously, the major advantage of this proposal for the “big 
three” is that they retain their individual permanent seats along 
with an institutional preservation of their substantive veto 
prerogative.202  The disadvantage comes in the form of power 
dilution: It is more influential to be one of five permanent Security 
Council members than one of seven.  However, this concern is offset 
by the fact that only China, Russia, and the United States will be 
present at every UNSC meeting—the other permanent members 
will only appear on a two-year rotation cycle every four years. 
For China, a country in transition from a dogmatic communist-
era nation to a burgeoning market economy trying to hold its 
dissenting provinces together in one state,203 retention of the 
Security Council seat with a substantive veto would provide a sense 
of stability in a rapidly changing world.  China would argue, and 
rightly so, that as the most populous nation with the greatest 
potential market on earth, it is only logical that it retain its 
permanent seat.  The major downside for China is that it must 
contend with its traditional geopolitical rivals, India and Japan, at 
the Security Council on a regular basis.  Nevertheless, China would 
likely go along with acceptance of the proposal to foster the image it 
has pursued as a fighter for developing countries around the 
world.204 
From the perspective of Russia, remaining relevant these days 
is a perpetual goal—given Russia’s multiple internal political, social, 
and economic crises after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
accompanying diminution in influence over developing norms of 
post-Cold War international law and policy.  For a country locked in 
 
 201 See generally O’Neill, supra note 188, at 219; Snyder, supra note 16, at 9-10. 
 202 “[I]n power terms, while the United States, Russia and China merit a 
continuing permanent seat on the Security Council whatever new arrangements 
may be made, this cannot any longer be argued automatically on behalf of Britain 
and France.  They are there for historic reasons.”  ARNOLD, supra note 89, at 160. 
 203 See generally China’s Reform: Now Comes the Hard Part, FORTUNE, Mar. 1, 1999, 
at 158. 
 204 FASSBENDER, supra note 11, at 240. 
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turmoil, with flagging political credibility and an economy that has 
shrunk to half that of the USSR, the continued presence of Russia on 
the Security Council with its veto power intact is a major coup.205  
The Kremlin, under newly elected President Vladimir Putin, 
desperately needs to foster the perception at home of continued 
international deference to Russia206 in order to shore up its 
credibility after the conclusion of the Chechnya campaign.207  
Consequently, Russia can likely be relied upon to go along with any 
proposal that identifies it as a critically important co-architect of 
future world affairs. 
 
 205 Fareed Zakaria, Editorial, Let’s Get Our Superpowers Straight, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
26, 1997, at A21. 
 206 “Russians may be too weak and dependent on the West to protest effectively 
against the NATO bombings [in Serbia] . . . .  But their Security Council veto . . . 
makes it vital to make them feel involved.  Many Russians feel humiliated by the 
loss of their superpower status.” Orlando Figes, We Must Let the Bear Dance in Our 
Ring, TIMES (London), Apr. 11, 1999, Features, available at 1999 WL 14486512. 
 207 Michael Wines, Putin Wins Russia Vote in First Round, But His Majority Is Less 
Than Expected, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2000, at A1. 
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While the United States must readjust its formula for 
manipulating the Security Council toward the furtherance of its 
foreign policy ends,208 Washington does not suffer much from a 
reconfigured Council, beyond encountering the trouble of a new 
mathematical headache.  Indeed, the expansion of the Council from 
five to seven permanent members is much more modest than the 
unwieldy proposals for expansion to ten or fifteen permanent 
members, and is therefore in line with U.S. preferences for the 
retention of a small, workable, and efficient body. 
The advent of the procedural veto is a new creature with which 
the United States must learn to reckon, but identifying and 
exploiting the self-interest of other states to U.S. advantage is a great 
American foreign affairs trait.209  Consolidating Britain, the United 
States’ staunchest ally on the Security Council, with France and 
Germany into a single European seat, weakens the majority and 
consensus-building apparatus that the United States has 
traditionally employed for fifty-five years.  However, careful 
planning of new initiatives can be presented when the U.K. occupies 
the European seat.  Moreover, the United States has already 
signaled its readiness to pursue reform along the lines of this 
proposal.210 
 
 208 Because of the political, monetary, and military weight it carries in the world 
community, the United States has traditionally been able to “persuade” other 
members of the UNSC not to vote against its initiatives by giving them what they 
want on other issues in other arenas.  America has also been successful in parlaying 
the threat of a veto into an abstention on occasion.  This practice has become so 
common that recently Russia indicated to the United States that the price for its 
going along with a new American-sponsored weapons inspection regime under 
UNSC authority in Iraq was that it be given a free hand to deal with its own 
secessionist province, Chechnya, without Security Council attention to the matter.  
Judith Miller, The Trade-Off, Russia Offers to Bargain, Using Iraq as Its Bait, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 19, 1999, at A20.  Russia went on to conduct a brutal military campaign to 
suppress the rebels in Chechnya without interference from the UNSC. 
 209 A ready example of the United States leveraging UNSC votes for action was 
in the case of Resolution 678, authorizing the use of force against Iraq during the 
Gulf War.  In exchange for their votes, America promised financial aid to Colombia, 
Ivory Coast, Ethiopia and Zaire, hard currency from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to 
the Soviet Union, exclusion of the Baltic states issue from the November 1990 Paris 
summit, the lifting of the Tiannamen Square-triggered trade sanctions against 
China, and support of China’s World Bank loan application for $114.3 million.  
Caron, supra note 9, at 563-64, n.42.  Although some may argue that such vote 
manipulation through linkage to other issues is the exception rather than the rule, 
see id. at 564, it would be naive to think that the world’s greatest power does not 
use all of the great many tools in its foreign policy toolbox to achieve its ends. 
 210 See discussion infra section IV(A). 
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2.  The European Union, Britain, France, and Germany 
For the European Union (E.U.) as an evolving and powerful 
intergovernmental organization, it is important that all three states 
representing the continent on the UNSC are E.U. member states 
(two of which, France and Germany, were founding members).  This 
fact by itself carries great weight for the E.U., and further legitimizes 
it as a viable entity  
broadly impacting international law and policy.  Born ten years after 
the U.N., the E.U., as it expands, is quickly becoming synonymous 
with Europe.211 
Within the E.U., Britain and France stand to lose the most by 
way of stature on the reformed Security Council since each of their 
previously exclusive permanent seats is consolidated into one 
European seat and shared with a third country.  Realistically, it is 
becoming increasingly difficult for either of them to justify, 
politically or economically, retention of a permanent seat.212  
Nonetheless, in deference to many years of judicious veto usage on 
the Council,213 their respective veto powers remain unchanged, as 
the European veto is considered “substantive” rather than 
“procedural.”  Of course, persuading Britain and France to accept 
this change in their circumstance voluntarily without vetoing it is 
 
 211 The current E.U. member states include Austria, Belgium, Britain, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, and Sweden.  Six more countries (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia) are already in negotiations with the E.U. 
to become members by 2003, and seven others (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Romania, Turkey, Slovakia, and Turkey) have received invitations from the E.U. to 
pursue membership candidacy.  Edmund L. Andrews, European Union’s Tough but 
Relentless Drive to Expand, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1999, at C22. 
 212 ARNOLD, supra note 89, at 160.  Arnold notes the following: 
Britain and France . . . may both be described as powers in decline:  
each has seen its empire disappear in the years since 1945 and in each 
case through the years of the Cold War they found themselves 
overshadowed by the superpowers although their insistence upon 
becoming nuclear powers gave them a pretence of superior authority 
which now looks hollow.  Britain reinforced its declining influence by 
acting as the loyal lieutenant of the United States, invoking the so-
called ‘special relationship’ in order to do so . . . .  When France 
carried out a series of nuclear tests in the South Pacific during 1995 to 
cause a great international outcry the reason was as much to assert its 
great power status as it was necessary for the attainment of fresh 
nuclear knowledge. 
Id. 
 213 Between 1946 and 1997, France cast its veto only eighteen times and Britain 
thirty times, compared to 116 vetoes cast by the U.S.S.R. and seventy-two by the 
United States.  BAILEY, supra note 23, at 239 tbl. 9. 
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problematic at best.214  Expecting that it will happen soon is perhaps 
equally unrealistic.215  A creative package of incentives must be 
constructed to aid in this effort,216 otherwise there is neither an 
international nor a domestic political incentive for Britain or France 
to agree to such a compromise.217 
 
 214 Gavin Esler, United Only in Discord, SCOTSMAN, Sept. 20, 1999, at 13, available 
at 1999 WL 25232325.  From a practical point of view, Mr. Esler writes: 
In terms of influence Britain wields a surprisingly big stick. But if you 
ask how Britain and France today justify being among the permanent 
five members of the UN Security Council, even the best British 
diplomats struggle to find a convincing answer . . . .  So, I once asked 
one of our men at the UN, what would happen if Brazil, India, Japan 
or the European Union sought a permanent seat on the Security 
Council and Britain was thrown off, ending our veto on UN action? 
We would veto it, came the instant, and not very good humoured, 
reply.  The sordid truth is that the five countries who really run the 
UN are all, for different reasons, terrified of change, especially any 
change which might make the UN a little less useless. The British and 
French know any serious reform would probably entail the loss of 
their Security Council seats. The Russians and Chinese do not want a 
truly effective UN because it would more aggressively meddle to 
dismantle tyrannies and fading empires—like theirs. 
Id. 
 215 ARNOLD, supra note 89, at 164. 
 216 An initial grouping of possible motivators besides allowing France and the 
U.K. to retain their substantive veto rights when they occupy the European seat 
might include (1) A provision that their seats become automatically reactivated and 
they are immediately recalled to vote upon Chapter VII use of force authorizations 
(the drawback of such a provision is that if Germany happened to occupy the seat 
when such issues arose, that would unfairly give Europe three votes with 
substantive veto power on the issue), (2) A reduction in their financial assessments 
for the annual U.N. budget—currently, the respective assessments for France and 
Britain are 6% and 5.02% of the total budget (to be offset by an increase in 
assessments for new occupants of the permanent regional rotating seats), and (3) 
Recognition of the massive, world-shaping contributions that France and Britain 
have made to the advancement of international peace and security through their 
opposition to aggression in World Wars I and II, their near completion of the de-
colonization process, their generous continuation of foreign aid and debt relief, and 
their acceptance of UNSC reform by agreeing to consolidate the European seat and 
share with Germany. 
 217 Some have cited the declining significance of Britain and France in other 
world organizations to argue that their positions on the UNSC should become more 
reflective of reality.  Peter Kellner, Britain’s U.N. Sacrifice for a ‘New World Order,’ 
INDEPENDENT (London), Jan. 25, 1991, at 21.  Mr. Kellner writes:  
There is a precedent for adapting powerful world organisations [sic] 
so that they reflect the real, instead of nostalgic, rankings of their 
members. Votes in the International Monetary Fund are held like 
those of shareholders in a company - in proportion to their stake. In 
the early years of the IMF, Britain was the second-largest shareholder 
and held almost one-fifth of its votes. By 1970 Britain’s stake had 
fallen to 10 per cent, and by 1980 to 7 per cent. The latest revision has 
reduced Britain to 5.35 per cent, the same as France - and below 
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Germany, of course, stands to gain the most by securing a 
permanent seat on the Council as well as a substantive veto 
power.218  That the German representative must share the seat with 
Britain and France is of less consequence than finally moving out 
from under the institutional bias against the defeated Axis states of 
World War II.219  Although German accession to the UNSC is 
opposed by some of its weaker neighbors, such as Italy,220 a clear 
case can be made for Germany to occupy a permanent seat.221  
Moreover, as Germany has reunified and reasserted itself as the 
leader within the European Union during the last decade,222 
permanent membership on the UNSC would complete Germany’s 
long awaited return to full participation in world affairs. 
3.  New Permanent Regional Rotating Member States 
An old adage holds that “half a loaf is better than none.”  These 
new members move literally from no permanent presence to 
permanent seats with modified veto powers.  The good news for 
Latin America and Africa, after so many years of marginalization, is 
that they will finally attain permanent representation on the 
Council.  While Asia was represented geographically by China’s 
membership, China certainly has not represented that vast 
 
Germany and Japan, which have 5.95 per cent.  Had national 
jealousies prevented the IMF from adapting, its authority would 
inevitably have been dented. (Whether that authority has always been 
used wisely is another matter: the point here is that it has been, and is, 
considerable.) A new world order will require a similar capacity by 
the Security Council to adapt itself. And if that prompts Britain and 
France to abandon their vestigial claims to Great Power status, the 
sooner the better. 
Id. 
 218 In contrast, Japan’s accession to the Council only secures it a procedural veto. 
 219 Such bias is still reflected in the text of the U.N. Charter which refers to both 
Germany and Japan as enemy states in Articles 53 and 107 by direct implication.  
U.N. CHARTER, arts. 53 & 107. 
 220 FASSBENDER, supra note 11, at 244-45.  See also Lewis, supra note 177 (“Italy . . . 
does not want to see Germany become a permanent member unless it becomes one, 
too.”). 
 221 ARNOLD, supra note 89, at 161-62.  The author states the following: 
[T]he reunification of Germany in 1990 resulted in the re-emergence 
of Europe’s strongest state . . . .  With a population of 82 million, a 
GNP of just under US$2 trillion and the third largest economy in both 
output and sophistication in the world, Germany could advance a 
major claim to a permanent seat on the Security Council, and one that 
it has become increasingly difficult to deny. 
Id. 
 222 Id. 
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continent’s myriad complex issues.223  Now Asia, the largest and 
most populous region, will have members rotating through its 
permanent regional seat who are quite different from one another. 
Nonetheless, there is some resistance to the premise of a 
permanent regional rotating Security Council seat, based upon the 
assumption that it is another, highly visible expression of the unfair 
distribution of power between developed and developing nations 
within the U.N. structure.224  Notably, both India and Mexico 
oppose such a scheme due to the fact that, as previously articulated, 
only developing countries were subjected to it.225   
 
 
However, such opposition is ameliorated under this proposal by the 
creation of a permanent European regional rotating seat, shared by 
developed, industrialized states.226 
a.  Latin America 
Brazil, long considered a candidate for a permanent seat,227 will 
finally gain institutional recognition for its economic weight in the 
Western Hemisphere228 and Mexico will come into its own on the 
international stage after many years of activity in the international 
arena.229  Argentina and Chile are traditional South American rivals 
who can be expected to campaign vigorously for selection to fill the 
remaining Latin American seat.  If selected, Argentina would realize 
the fruits of its efforts at reintegration into the world community 
after the disastrous Falkland Islands War of 1982.230  For its part, 
 
 223 REINHARD DRIFTE, JAPAN’S QUEST FOR A PERMANENT SECURITY COUNCIL SEAT, A 
MATTER OF PRIDE OR JUSTICE? 193-94 (2000). 
 224 U.N. Press Release GA/9688, supra note 59. 
 225 FASSBENDER, supra note 11, at 260. 
 226 See discussion supra section IV(B)(2). 
 227 During World War II, both President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell 
Hull promised Brazil a permanent seat on the Security Council during the 
discussions leading to the creation of the U.N.; however, that promise was never 
realized.  ARNOLD, supra note 89, at 163. 
 228 Id. 
 229 Both countries must be persuaded to participate in this arrangement if it is to 
work.  Mexico opposes an increase in the permanent membership as a perpetuation 
of undemocratic principles.  Id. at 249; U.N. Press Release GA/9689, supra note 94.  
Brazil has come out against the idea of permanent regional rotating seats.  Id. 
 230 See generally Eugene Robinson & Don Podesta, Argentina Enjoying Stable 
Economy, New Global Role, WASH.  POST, Nov. 16, 1991, at A21; After the War: 
Argentina and the West, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 14, 1982, at 24.  Argentina 
supports an “open rotation” system with universal suffrage as opposed to a 
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Chile’s selection would help close the remaining psychological 
wounds inflicted by the Pinochet dictatorship—much as the 1986 
integration of Spain into the European Union helped it achieve 
closure after the Franco years.231 
Active participation in world affairs is not a new concept for 
these states.  All four countries are policy leaders in the 
Organization of American States (OAS).  Brazil and Argentina are 
founding members of the South American trading block 
MERCOSUR,232 and Mexico is part of the triumvirate which created 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).233  Chile was 
seriously considered for integration into NAFTA, but was bypassed 
for domestic political reasons in the United States.234  Brazil, at least, 
has indicated its willingness to give up its campaign for an 
individual permanent seat on the Security Council in exchange for a 
single, shared Latin American regional seat.235 
b.  Africa 
In Africa, a division is often made between Saharan and Sub-
Saharan, Arabic and Black, Muslim and non-Muslim nations.236  The 
 
regional system.  U.N. Press Release GA/9688, supra note 59. 
 231 Michel Rosenfeld, Constitution-Making, Identity Building, and Peaceful 
Transition to Democracy: Theoretical Reflections Inspired by the Spanish Example, 19 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1891, 1908, 1918-20 (1998). 
 232 U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, The History of Mercosur, available at 
http://www.mac.doc.gov/ola/mercosur/mgi/history.htm (last visited May 10, 
2000). 
 233 Michael J. Kelly, Bringing a Complaint Under the NAFTA Environmental Side 
Accord: Difficult Steps Under a Procedural Paper Tiger, but Movement in the Right 
Direction, 24 PEPP. L. REV. 71, 72 (1996). 
 234 Jeffrey Lax, Note, A Chile Forecast for Accession to NAFTA: A Process of 
Economic, Legal and Environmental Harmonization, 7 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 97, 
97 (1999); Mack McLarty, Editorial, Fast Track Isn’t Fast Enough, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 
1999, at A15.  President Clinton failed to gain fast-track negotiating authority from 
Congress.  See Kevin G. Hall, Former Envoy Urges Chile to Reconsider NAFTA, J. 
COMMERCE, May 7, 1999, at 4A. 
 235 Diana Jean Schemo, As Washington’s Attention Wanders, Brazil Plays a Quiet 
Catch-Up Game, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1997, at A6. 
 236 See generally DONALD ROTHSCHILD, MANAGING ETHNIC CONFLICT IN AFRICA: 
PRESSURES AND INCENTIVES FOR COOPERATION (1997); John Baines, Book Review, Was 
Civilization Made in Africa?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1991, at 12; Barbara Crossette, U.S. 
Official Calls Muslim Militants a Threat to Africa, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1992, at 3; Richard 
Dowden, Democracy: Africa’s Last Best Hope?; Across the Continent, the Old Dictators 
Have Been Swept Aside.  But This Is Not a Brave New World, INDEPENDENT (London), 
Dec. 19, 1991, at 21 (“Africa contains such a vast diversity of ethnic groups, social 
structures, languages and beliefs that it is impossible to generalize about a 
traditional African political or social system.”); Gwynne Dyer, Into the Abyss, Why Is 
Africa Plagued by War, Genocide, Famine and Poverty?, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 
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permanent regional UNSC seat for Africa, which calls for 
representation by both Egypt and South Africa, bridges this division 
on all counts, and does so while also recognizing the democratic 
governments and economic strengths of both countries.  The 
selection between Nigeria and Kenya as the third rotating state in 
the African seat takes into account the regional influence of both, 
but leaves open the question of which has the strongest claim to 
maintaining democratic institutions, observing the rule of law, 
controlling official corruption, and ensuring a stable society.237 
Because all of the obvious African candidate states support the 
OAU’s position that Africa is entitled to no less than two permanent 
Security Council seats,238 intense negotiation on this point must 
occur for this article’s plan to work.  Alternatively,  the OAU’s 
position might be adopted in principle, and this article’s proposal 
re-worked to allocate two permanent seats each for the other 
regions: Asia, Europe and Latin America.  However, such a move 
would invite consternation from the developing world toward a 
second European regional seat, even if it were dedicated to Eastern 
Europe.  Moreover, it would hamper the initiative to consolidate 
France and Britain into a rotating regional scheme. 
c.  Asia 
Although long dominated by China, Asia will achieve a more 
diverse representation on the UNSC under this proposal via 
 
12, 1996, at G1. 
 237 Neither Nigeria nor Kenya have particularly good track records on these 
counts.  Ethan Bronner, Vague on Reforms, Nigeria’s President-Elect Woos New York, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1999, at A6; Resisting Reform in Kenya, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1997, 
at A18; Nigeria’s Clean Broom, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1999, at A42; see generally, Ruth 
Gordon, Saving Failed States: Sometimes a Neocolonialist Notion, 12 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 903 (1997); Howard W. French, Before Africans Vote, Men in Charge Rewrite 
Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1995, at A3.  Mr. French noted that: 
In Kenya, supporters of the longtime leader, President Daniel arap 
Moi, who was pressed earlier in the decade by international creditors 
to accept a more open multiparty system, have taken to assaulting 
rivals, notably Richard Leakey, the paleontologist, who began 
organizing an opposition party earlier this year.  When the military in 
Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country, decided it could not 
stomach the result of democratic elections two years ago, it canceled 
the results. The widely assumed winner, Moshood K. O. Abiola, was 
imprisoned on treason charges after he insisted that his mandate be 
respected. 
Id. 
 238 U.N. Press Release GA/9688, supra note 59; U.N. Press Release GA/9692, 
supra note 114. 
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permanent membership.  Japan, an emergent champion of foreign 
aid and peace efforts worldwide in the latter twentieth century,239 
clearly has a valid claim to a permanent seat.240  Like Germany, 
Japan’s post-World War II penance is now over, and its 
reintroduction into the highest level of institutional international 
policy-making apparatus is certainly appropriate.241  Although 
Japan’s “mono-ethnic” cultural reputation of domestic intolerance of 
foreigners is well known, there is evidence that this aspect of its 
personality is now changing.242  Moreover, Japan is taking new steps 
in the direction of dispatching its own armed forces to participate in 
U.N. peacekeeping operations.243 
India, the largest democracy on earth with a population of over 
one billion, should also gain its rightful spot as a permanent 
member244 of the new UNSC.245  Not lost in this decision are the 
 
 239 See ARNOLD, supra note 89, at 161.  Arnold notes: 
In 1995, Japan was the world’s leading creditor nation with net 
overseas assets at a record US$689,000 million; it was the largest 
provider of foreign aid (at a level of US$13 billion a year) for the 
fourth consecutive year; while its economic power was felt 
increasingly in every sphere of international activity. 
Id.  
 240 Masayuki Tadokoro, A Japanese View on Restructuring the Security Council, in 
THE ONCE AND FUTURE SECURITY COUNCIL, supra note 136, at 119-33; Fusakazu 
Izumura, Should Japan Get a Permanent Seat on the U.N. Security Council?, TOKYO BUS. 
TODAY, Mar. 1993, at 54.  
 241 Id.  See generally DRIFTE, supra note 223. 
 242 Howard W. French, ‘Japanese Only’ Policy Takes Body Blow in Court, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 15, 1999, at A1.  A Japanese court recently made what is considered a 
landmark ruling in favor of Ana Bortz, a Brazilian resident of Japan, in a case where 
Ms. Bortz was discriminated against on the basis of her ethnicity, following an 
interpretation of Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, signed by Japan in 1996.  Since the judge’s decision was based on 
international law, it is not reviewable by a higher Japanese court.  Referring to the 
over-arching cultural bias against foreigners in Japan, Ms. Bortz stated: 
This sort of thing is a very big problem in Japan, but its discussion has 
remained taboo.  This country has signed international conventions 
against discrimination but has never wanted to deal with the subject 
domestically.  For a country that talks about getting a chair on the 
Security Council, these kinds of attitudes are just shocking. 
Id. 
 243 Izumura, supra note 240.  The participation of troops from the Japanese Self-
Defense Forces in the U.N. peacekeeping operations for Cambodia was considered 
a major breakthrough in Japanese foreign policy.  Japanese forces, however, are still 
required to withdraw immediately in the event of an outbreak of armed warfare.  
Id. at 55. 
 244 “India has as good a claim to a permanent seat as does China and, barring the 
accident of history which meant it was still part of the British Empire in 1945, it 
would almost certainly have been considered for a seat at the time the United 
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proven nuclear capacity of India and the elements of ethnic and 
religious diversity that seating a Hindu nation would bring.  Since 
its founding, India has been a reliable contributor to U.N. 
peacekeeping missions around the globe.246  However, India’s 
contested occupation of Kashmir in defiance of two UNSC 
resolutions must be resolved if its campaign for a permanent seat is 
to succeed.247  Additionally, in order for the system of permanent 
regional rotating seats to work, India’s opposition to such a system 
as discriminatory must be overcome.248 
The choice between Indonesia and Pakistan to represent Asia’s 
Muslim populace is a difficult one.  Both have problematic 
democratic records.249  While Indonesia is now emerging from a 
long dictatorship, Pakistan has fallen back into one.  While 
Indonesia has a stronger economy, Pakistan is a nuclear power.  
Indeed, the choice is problematic.  Indonesia is the fourth most 
populous nation in the world and constitutes the largest Muslim 
country.250  It has also undergone political reform by ending 
Suharto’s dictatorship, freely electing a democratic-minded 
president,251 and releasing the province of East Timor from its grasp 
through a referendum.252  On the other hand Pakistan, long the arch 
 
Nations was formed.”  ARNOLD, supra note 89, at 162. 
 245 India is consistently regarded as a definite candidate for permanent 
membership.  Among its top supporters are Russia, United Nations Press Release, 
GA/9692, supra, note 114, and France, India, France Discuss U.N. Security Council 
Expansion, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Sept. 25, 1999, available at 1999 WL 25112785. 
 246 Satish Nambiar, United Nations Peace-keeping Operations, in THE UNITED 
NATIONS AT FIFTY, AN INDIAN VIEW, supra note 57, at 77, 81-83.  India has contributed 
troops and personnel to peacekeeping missions in the Gaza Strip and Sinai (1956), 
Lebanon (1958), Congo (1960), West Irian (1962-63), Yemen (1963-64), Cyprus 
(1964), Iran-Iraq (1988-90), Namibia (1989-90), Angola (1989-91, 1995), Iraq-Kuwait 
(1991), Central America (1990-92), El Salvador (1991-94), Kampuchea (1992-93), 
Yugoslavia (1992-93), Mozambique (1993-94), Somalia (1993-94), Liberia (1994), and 
Rwanda (1994-95).  Id. 
 247 Crossette, supra note 99. 
 248 “[C]reating a third category of [permanent] membership based on rotation 
would not meet the aspirations of developing countries as they would continue to 
be subjected to a discriminatory regime.”  U.N. Press Release GA/9688, supra note 
59. 
 249 Seth Mydans, Governing Tortuously: Indonesia’s President Outflanks the General, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2000, at A8 [hereinafter Mydans, Governing Tortuously]; Dugger 
& Bearak, supra note 197. 
 250 See FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, INDONESIA, 
Introduction (William H. Frederick & Robert L. Worden eds., 1992), available at  
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cshome.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2001). 
 251 Mydans, Governing Tortuously, supra note 249; Seth Mydans, New Indonesian 
Leader Governs With a Light Touch, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1999, at A3. 
 252 Christopher S. Wren, U.N. Creates an Authority to Start Governing East Timor, 
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rival of India, is a declared nuclear power253 and has continually 
committed many thousands of troops to U.N. peacekeeping efforts 
in far-flung regions throughout many decades, thus evidencing the 
seriousness with which it takes its U.N. membership 
responsibilities.254  Nevertheless, Pakistan’s democratic efforts 
recently fell to a coup d’état, toppling its elected Prime Minister and 
installing the Army Chief of Staff.255  This calls into serious question 
both the country’s stability and its ability to serve on the Council. 
Be that as it may, the seating of India and not Pakistan would 
exacerbate the climate of antagonism and rivalry which already 
exists between them.256  The seating of both would ensure that these 
two parties who have been squabbling since independence from 
Britain would be under pressure to address their unresolved 
security issues, such as the fate of Kashmir, a flashpoint province 
occupied by hostile troops of both countries.257  Dual seating might 
optimistically also help forge a new security framework for the 
subcontinent. 
C.  Addition of Non-Permanent Members 
Beyond the proposed seventeen-member Security Council, it 
will likely be politically necessary to add more non-permanent seats 
to the Council in order to gain the General Assembly’s acceptance of 
this article’s plan to reconfigure the permanent seats.  Indeed, 
India’s ambassador to the U.N. has asserted that an expansion of 
both non-permanent and permanent seats is required.258  The United 
States has stated that it would ultimately find a Council of twenty 
 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1999, at A8. 
 253 Dugger & Bearak, supra note 197. 
 254 See FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, PAKISTAN, 
International Organizations (1994), available at 
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cshome.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2001). 
 255 Dugger & Bearak, supra note 197. 
 256 Pakistan has expressed a strong sentiment against India’s accession to the 
UNSC, see FASSBENDER, supra note 11, at 246.  See also Dugger & Bearak, supra note 
197; Christopher Lockwood, British Plans for a U.N. Rapid-Reaction Force Are 
Attacked, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Sept. 5, 2000, at 17. 
 257 Dugger & Bearak, supra note 197. 
 258 Common Ground program No. 9928 (radio broadcast, July 13, 1999), available at 
http://commongroundradio.org/transcpt/99/9928.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2000).  
In an interview with Keith Porter of the Stanley Foundation, Ambassador Kamlesh 
Sharma said that “unless there is an expansion of both permanent and 
nonpermanent members that gives an expression to the aspirations and 
perspectives of the developing world you will not have the voice of the Security 
Council carrying either balance or conviction.”  Id. 
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members or more acceptable.259  Consequently, if three or four more 
non-permanent seats were added, a Council of twenty or twenty-
one states would become reality.260  The question then becomes, on 
what basis would these three new seats be allocated?  The 
traditional method of apportionment for the ten current non-
permanent seats is by regional representation through General 
Assembly election.  Each state elected to a non-permanent seat, 
whether it is to represent Africa, Eastern Europe, Latin America or 
another region, gets a two-year term in that seat and is 
automatically ineligible to serve again immediately.261  The three 
new states could be apportioned within this existing regional 
distribution, adding an extra seat for East Asia for example, based 
on population or some other criteria. 
Alternatively, the three new seats could be filled as “at large” 
positions on a world-wide basis.  Such a mechanism of universal 
suffrage has already been suggested by the U.N. permanent 
representative for New Zealand.262  In practice, this would mean 
that, in addition to the seven permanent seats and the ten non-
permanent regional seats, there would be three seats filled by states 
elected from the world at large, whose constituency during their 
term of election would be truly global. 
V.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In the final analysis, the vast majority of states, organizations, 
and commentators agree on the basic premise that reconfiguration 
of the U.N. Security Council is overdue.  However, the consensus 
stops there.  The parties remain at odds over the method of reform.  
While some emphasize keeping the Council small, thereby 
safeguarding its newfound willingness to act, as well as its 
efficiency and effectiveness, others emphasize expanding the 
permanent membership to increase its representativeness, thereby 
bolstering the legitimacy of its decisions. 
 
The method of accession is also in dispute.  Many countries 
endorse the candidacies of Germany and Japan, two of the largest 
financial contributors to the U.N. budget.  These endorsements are 
 
 259 See discussion supra section III(A). 
 260 A twenty-one member Council would be more mathematically balanced in 
that it would consist of fourteen non-permanent members and seven permanent 
members, reflecting the two to one ratio that currently exists. 
 261 BAILEY, supra note 23, at 142-43, 152-53. 
 262 U.N. Press Release GA/9688, supra note 59; Roundtable, supra note 199. 
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typically accompanied by proposals for the creation of regional 
permanent seats, one each for Latin America, Africa, and Asia.  
While many states are finding common ground on the principle that 
such regional permanent seats should rotate among several states, 
discord remains over how such seats should be filled. 
Most proposals also include provisions to preserve, completely 
eliminate, or somehow limit the veto prerogative wielded by the 
current five permanent members.  There is also disagreement over 
whether new permanent members acceding to the Council should 
be granted such a veto power.  However, there is unanimous 
agreement among Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United 
States that their veto power must remain intact; any attempt to take 
it away, therefore, will presumably be vetoed. 
Given this diplomatic dynamic and the stalemate in which the 
reform initiative now finds itself, this article offers a compromise 
solution.  Individual permanent membership, complete with 
substantive veto power, should be retained for China, Russia, and 
the United States.  Substantive veto power should also be retained 
for Britain and France, but their individual permanent seats should 
be collapsed into a European regional permanent seat shared with 
Germany, on a two-year rotating basis. 
Latin America should gain a regional permanent seat that 
rotates among Brazil, Mexico, and either Argentina or Chile.  Africa 
should gain a regional permanent seat that rotates among Egypt, 
South Africa, and either Nigeria or Kenya.  Asia should gain a 
regional permanent seat that rotates among Japan, India, and either 
Indonesia or Pakistan.  Each of these three new permanent seats 
should be granted a procedural rather than substantive veto 
prerogative. 
The difference in veto prerogative is one of effect.  If a 
substantive veto is used, the matter is dead.  If a procedural veto is 
used, the matter is referred to the General Assembly for timely 
consideration—meaning limited debate and majority vote, and 
referred back to the Security Council with that veto either 
overturned or endorsed.  If the Assembly were not in session when 
a procedural veto is cast, a standing committee of pre-selected states 
would consider the matter and take a straight majority vote.  
Moreover, the use of either a substantive or procedural veto should 
be accompanied by an explanation for its use. 
 
Under this plan, neither Britain nor France continues to occupy 
seats that are out of proportion to their place in twenty-first century 
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world affairs but the price for their movement to a shared seat is the 
retention of the substantive veto power.  Germany and Japan are 
accorded the permanent seats that they deserve, and Germany gains 
its position on the “equal footing” with Britain and France that it 
demands.  The key regional powers in Latin America, Africa, and 
Asia are accorded representation on the UNSC with “a veto power,” 
although not substantive. 
Additionally, several reform goals are simultaneously 
achieved.  The selection of states dramatically increases the 
economic, cultural, religious, ethnic, and geographic diversity of the 
Council’s permanent membership.  However, this is done without 
sacrificing efficiency or effectiveness since the permanent 
membership is only increased from five to seven states at any given 
meeting, and the possibility of a measure receiving a substantive 
veto is reduced from five to four.  Granting a procedural veto power 
to new regional members accords them a degree of dignity that is 
sought while not proliferating the veto prerogative overall.  Finally, 
the provision for General Assembly consideration of procedural 
vetoes meets the calls for greater assembly input into UNSC 
decision-making. 
Of course, in order to implement such a plan, there will likely 
be concomitant demands to expand the non-permanent membership 
on the Council.  The proposal as stated would create a Security 
Council of seventeen.  All of the major powers have agreed that a 
Council of twenty or more states is not out of the question.  
Therefore, adding three more non-permanent seats would meet that 
threshold in exchange for adoption of the reform package for 
permanent membership.  Allocation of these new non-permanent 
seats could be by region or on a universal basis, with states running 
as “at-large” candidates, representing the global community on the 
Council. 
This proposal seeks to assist governments and national 
delegations in breaking the impasse that has hampered UNSC 
restructuring negotiations to date.  Reinvigorating the debate along 
these lines is this author’s purpose.  Mustering the political will to 
agree upon and carry through a reform package is the challenge to 
the U.N. member states.  Clearly, the Security Council must be re-
tooled to enter the new millennium competently and equipped to 
act decisively for the continued insurance of international peace and 
security.  The global community expects it, and the future citizens of 
the world deserve it. 
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APPENDIX 
GENERAL STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF POTENTIAL CANDIDATES FOR 
PERMANENT SEATS ON THE REFORMED U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL263 
I.  PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA264 
A.  Background 
For much of the past 2,000 years China has been the driving 
force in Asia.  The continent’s second largest country (after Russia) 
is the most populous in the world, home to one in five of all people.  
Natural resources, including coal and iron ore, are also plentiful. 
By 200 B.C. the Chinese state had expanded from its realm in 
the Yellow River Basin into central and southern Asia.  While the 
West stagnated in the early Middle Ages, China achieved its high-
water mark of prosperity and artistic achievement during the Tang 
dynasty, A.D. 618-909.  Chinese technology astonished Marco Polo, 
who arrived in 1275.  By the eighteenth century China was larger 
than ever; the addition of 200 million new mouths to feed set off a 
decline, hastened in the nineteenth century by repeated rebellions 
and wars with Western trading powers.  Britain introduced Indian 
opium, and China’s efforts to limit import of the narcotic led to the 
Opium War of 1839-42.  As a result of this war, in 1898 China agreed 
to lease the Territory of Hong Kong to Britain for 99 years. 
In the early twentieth century, the revolutionaries led by Sun 
Yat-sen looked first to the West for a republican model of 
government, then turned to Soviet-style Marxism-Leninism.  
Rivalries between the ruling Nationalist Kuomintang Party under 
Chiang Kai-shek and the Communist Party under Mao Zedong 
continued through World War II; civil war from 1946-49 ended with 
the retreat of the Nationalists to Taiwan.  After Mao’s death in 1976 
Deng Xiaoping loosened state control and opened China to the 
 
 263 Except as otherwise separately noted, all of the statistics maps and edited text 
compiled for individual countries in this selective appendix were drawn from the 
CIA WORLD FACTBOOK (1999), available at http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/ 
factbook/index.html.  
 264 NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC ATLAS OF THE WORLD (6th ed. 1995), available at 
http://www.nationalgeographic.com/mapmachine/plates.html. (last visited Dec. 
4, 2000).   
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West.   
China’s attitude toward free-market economics came into sharp 
focus in 1997 with the end of the British lease on Hong Kong. Under 
Britain’s democratic and capitalist rule, Hong Kong enjoyed 
tremendous economic success.  The return to Chinese 
administration evoked fears that democratic freedoms might be lost.  
A Sino-British agreement signed in 1984 states that Hong Kong will 
maintain most of its democratic systems and its capitalist economy 
for at least 50 years. Hong Kong returned to Chinese rule on July 1, 
1997. 
 
Area Total: 9,596,960 sq. km 
Land: 9,326,410 sq. km 
Water: 270,550 sq. km 
Climate Extremely diverse, ranging 
from tropical in south, to 
subarctic in north  
Terrain Mostly mountainous in west, 
with plains, deltas, and hills in 
east 
Natural Resources Coal, iron ore, petroleum, 




aluminum, lead, zinc, 
uranium;  China also boasts 
the world’s largest 
hydropower potential  
Population 1,261,832,482 (July 2000 est.) 
Ethnic Groups Han Chinese 91.9%, Zhuang, 
Uygur, Hui, Yi, Tibetan, Miao, 
Manchu, Mongol, Buyi, 
Korean, and other nationalities 
8.1% 
Languages Standard Chinese or Mandarin 
(Putonghua, based on the 
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(Hokkien-Taiwanese), Xiang, 
Gan, Hakka dialects 
Legal System Chine uses a complex 
amalgam of custom and 
statute, based on a 
rudimentary civil code in 
effect since 1987  
 
B.  Economy 
Beginning in late 1978 the Chinese leadership has been trying to 
move the economy from a sluggish Soviet-style centrally planned 
economy to a more market-oriented economy, within a rigid 
political framework of Communist Party control.  To this end the 
authorities switched to a system of household responsibility in 
agriculture in place of the old collectivization, increased the 
authority of local officials and plant managers in industry, 
permitted a wide variety of small-scale enterprise in services and 
light manufacturing, and opened the economy to increased foreign 
trade and investment.  The result has been a quadrupling of GDP 
since 1978. 
Agricultural output doubled in the 1980s, and industry also 
posted major gains, especially in coastal areas near Hong Kong and 
opposite Taiwan, where foreign investment helped spur output of 
both domestic and export goods.  Beijing, however, has periodically 
backtracked, re-tightening central controls at intervals.  In late 1993 
China’s leadership approved additional long-term reforms aimed at 
giving still more play to market-oriented institutions and at 
strengthening the center’s control over the financial system; state 
enterprises would continue to dominate many key industries in a 
socialist market economy. 
In 1995-97 inflation dropped sharply, reflecting tighter 
monetary policies and stronger measures to control food prices.  
Popular resistance, changes in central policy, and loss of authority 
by rural cadres have weakened China’s population control program.  
Another long-term threat to continued rapid economic growth is the 
deterioration in the environment, notably air pollution, soil erosion, 
and the steady fall of the water table especially in the north. China 
continues to lose arable land because of erosion and economic 
development. 
 
GDP Purchasing Power $4.8 trillion (1999 estimate) 
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GDP Real Growth Rate 7% (1999 estimate) 
GDP Per Capita Purchasing 
Power Parity 
$ 3,800 (1999 estimate) 
Population Below Poverty 
Line 
10% (1999 estimate) 
Labor Force 700 million (1998 estimate) 
Industrial Production Growth 
Rate 
8.8 % (1999 estimate) 
Exports $ 194.9 billion (F.O.B. 1999) 
Imports $ 165.8 billion (C.I.F. 1999) 
External Debt $ 159 billion (1998 estimate) 
II.  RUSSIAN FEDERATION265 
A.  Background 
With a reach from Europe to Asia, Russia spans eleven time 
zones.  The heartland of the former Soviet Union, Russia is now 
officially a federation, and ethnic groups such as the Tatars and 
Bashkirs have their own autonomous republics within it. 
The country has rich mineral and energy resources.  The 
mighty Volga, Europe’s longest river, flows from northern Russia 
into the Caspian Sea.  Bleak, behemoth Siberia encompasses more 
than half the territory but is home to less than a tenth of the 
population.  Russians, who vastly outnumber indigenous Siberians, 
began arriving after Cossacks invaded the Tatar khanate of Sibir in 
1581.  Commodities such as fur and timber also earn coveted foreign 
currency.  The Baikal-Amur Mainline Railroad, begun in the 1930s, 
was finished in 1989. 
The history of Russia reaches back more than a thousand years.  
A Russian principality, ruled from Kiev, emerged in 911.  In 988 
Kievan Prince Vladimir adopted Byzantine Christianity and ordered 
his people to be baptized.  Their faith evolved into Russian 
Orthodoxy and helped isolate Russia from Roman Catholic Europe. 
Invading Mongols controlled Russia from 1240 to 1380.  Drawn 
into their Asiatic empire, the country became even more alien to 
Europe. In 1547 Ivan IV, a Muscovite prince, adopted the ancient 
title of caesar (tsar in Russian).  He and his successors unified 
fragmented lands and began taking the region that is today Siberia. 
Russia looked westward after 1698, when Peter the Great 
 
 265 CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 263. 
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returned from touring Europe. Conquering territory along the Baltic 
Sea, he built his landlocked realm a port capital, St. Petersburg, and 
established Russia’s first navy.  
The forced abdication of Nicholas II in March 1917 ended 
tsarist rule.  In November Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, a Marxist, wrested 
power from the provisional government.  The Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics was organized in 1922 out of four republics: 
Russia, Byelorussia, Ukraine, and Transcaucasia (Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, and Georgia). 
Lenin’s death in 1924 set off a power struggle won by Joseph 
Stalin, who ruthlessly collectivized Soviet agriculture, replacing 
peasant farms with large state-run enterprises.  A series of five-year 
plans developed heavy industry.  In the 1940s Stalin moved the 
Soviet boundary westward by annexing Moldavia and western 
Ukraine, and coerced the three Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania—into requesting annexation. 
Mikhail Gorbachev took office in 1985 and unveiled sweeping 
plans for economic restructuring followed by unprecedented 
political openness.  He also vested the Supreme Soviet, the core of 
the U.S.S.R.’s legislature, with power that challenged the 
Communist Party’s hegemony.  The party decided in February 1990 
to relinquish its constitutionally mandated monopoly. 
Changes came too fast for conservative hardliners, who 
mounted a doomed coup in August 1991.  Populist leader Boris 
Yeltsin—subsequently elected the first president of the emergent 
democratic Russian Federation—rallied the people, and the 
pendulum of power swung away from Gorbachev.  In December 
1991 Russia and ten other republics abolished the U.S.S.R. and 
formed the Commonwealth of Independent States, which now 
includes Georgia.  Yeltsin was succeeded by the election of Prime 
Minister Vladimir Putin to the Presidency in March 2000. 
 
Area Total: 17,075,200 sq. km 
Land: 16,995,800 sq. km 
Water: 79,400 sq. km 
Climate Russia’s climate ranges from 
steppes in the south through 
humid continental in much of 
European Russia; subarctic 
temperatures are found in 
Siberia, with tundra in the 
polar north; winters vary from 
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cool along Black Sea coast to 
frigid in Siberia; summers 
vary from warm in the steppes 
to cool along Arctic coast 
Terrain Broad plain with low hills 
west of Urals; vast coniferous 
forest and tundra in Siberia; 
uplands and mountains along 
southern border regions 
Natural Resources Wide natural resource base 
including major deposits of 
oil, natural gas, coal, minerals, 
and timber  
Population 146,001,176 (July 2000 est.) 
 
Ethnic Groups Russian 81.5%, Tatar 3.8%, 
Ukrainian 3%, Chuvash 1.2%, 
Bashkir 0.9%, Byelorussian 
0.8%, Moldavian 0.7%, other 
8.1% 
Primary Languages Russian 
Legal System Based on a civil law system 
with judicial review of 
legislative acts 
 
B.  Economy 
 Nine years after the collapse of the USSR, Russia is still 
struggling to establish a modern market economy and achieve 
strong economic growth.  The Russian GDP has contracted an 
estimated 43% since 1991, including a 5% drop in 1998, despite the 
country’s wealth of natural resources, its well-educated population, 
and its diverse industrial base.  By the end of 1997, Russia had 
achieved some progress. Inflation had been brought under control, 
the ruble was stabilized, and an ambitious privatization program 
had transferred thousands of enterprises to private ownership.  
Some important market-oriented laws were also passed, including a 
commercial code governing business relations and an arbitration 
court for resolving economic disputes.  But in 1998, the Asian 
financial crisis swept through the country, contributing to a sharp 
decline in Russia’s earnings from oil exports and resulting in an 
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exodus of foreign investors.  Matters came to a head in August 1998 
when the government allowed the ruble to fall precipitously and 
stopped payment on $40 billion in ruble bonds.  Russia’s transition 
to a market economy has also been slowed by the growing 
prevalence of payment arrears and barter and by widespread 
corruption. 
 
GDP Purchasing Power $ 620.3 billion (1999 estimate) 
GDP Real Growth Rate 3.2% (1999 estimate) 
GDP Per Capita Purchasing 
Power Parity 
$4,200 (1999 est.) 
Population Below Poverty 
Line 
40% (1999 est.) 
Labor Force 66 million (1997) 
Industrial Production Growth 
Rate 
8.1% (1999 est.) 
Exports $75.4 billion (1999 est.) 
Imports $48.2 billion (1999 est.) 
External Debt $166 billion (year end 1999) 
III.  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA266 
A.  Background 
One of the world’s most venerable democracies, the United 
States is just two centuries old as a nation.  In 1776, after 169 years of 
British rule, the 13 Atlantic colonies declared independence.  Less 
than a century later, unresolved political issues—slavery and states’ 
rights—were referred to the battlefields of the Civil War, which 
raged from 1861 to 1865.  After Reconstruction, the economy 
boomed and railroads opened more markets.  Before immigration 
restrictions were enacted in 1924, more than a hundred million 
people had arrived in the United States. 
The Depression of the 1930s closed factories and bankrupted 
farmers. President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal increased the 
federal government’s social responsibility.  Boom times returned 
after World War II, as people continued to abandon farms for cities. 
Since the first census in 1790, the center of U.S. population has 
steadily edged westward, then south.  The trend continued during 
 
 266 Id. 
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the 1980s, as populations grew by 22 percent in the West and 13 
percent in the South.  The nation has also become more urban: 
Three-quarters of Americans live in metropolitan areas, where 
poverty and ethnic tensions are problems. 
Roughly one in four U.S. citizens belonged to a minority in 
1994, including 33 million African Americans, 26 million Hispanics, 
and 9 million Asians and Pacific Islanders, the fastest growing 
group. 
 
Area Total: 9,629,091 sq. km 
Land: 9,158,960 sq. km 
Water: 470,131 sq. km 
Climate Mostly temperate, but tropical 
in Hawaii and Florida, arctic 
in Alaska, semiarid in the 
great plains west of the 
Mississippi River, and arid in 
the Great Basin of the 
southwest 
Terrain Vast central plains with 
mountains in the west, hills 
and low mountains in east 
 
 
Natural Resources Coal, copper, lead, 
molybdenum, phosphates, 
uranium, bauxite, gold, iron, 
mercury, nickel, potash, silver, 
tungsten, zinc, petroleum, 
natural gas, timber 
Population 281,421,906 (Dec. 2000 est.)267 
Ethnic Groups White 83.5%, black 12.4%, 
Asian 3.3%, American Indian 
0.8% (1992) 
Languages English, Spanish (spoken by a 
sizable minority) 
Legal System Based on English common law 
with judicial review of 
 
 267 United States Census Bureau, Census 2000 Products and Data, at 
http://www.census.gov/dmd/www/2khome.htm (last visited Dec. 28, 2000).    
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legislative acts 
 
B.  Economy 
The United States has the most powerful, diverse, and 
technologically advanced economy in the world, with a per capita 
GDP of $33,900, the largest among major industrial nations.  United 
States business firms enjoy considerably greater flexibility than their 
counterparts in Western Europe and Japan in decisions to expand 
capital plant, lay off surplus workers, and develop new products.  
At the same time, they face higher barriers to entry in their rivals’ 
home markets than the barriers to entry of foreign firms in U.S. 
markets.  The growth of technology largely explains the gradual 
development of a two-tier labor market in which those at the bottom 
lack the education and the professional/technical skills of those at 
the top, and often fail to get pay raises, health insurance coverage, 
and other benefits.268  Since 1975, practically all the gains in 
household income have gone to the top 20% of households. 
 
GDP Purchasing Power $9.255 trillion (1999 est.) 
GDP Real Growth Rate 4.1% (1999 est.) 
GDP Per Capita Purchasing 
Power Parity 
$33,900 (1999 est.) 
Population Below Poverty 
Line 
12.7% (1999 est.) 
 
Labor Force 139.4 million (includes 
unemployed) (1999) 
Industrial Production Growth 
Rate 
32.4% (1999 est.) 
Exports $663 billion (F.O.B., 1998 est.) 
Imports $912 billion (C.I.F., 1998 est.) 
External Debt $862 billion (1995 est.) 
 
 
 268 See generally ROBERT B. REICH, LOCKED IN THE CABINET (1997).  
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IV.  UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND269 
A.  Background 
The Channel Tunnel, opened in 1994, breaches the moat that 
separated the British Isles from mainland Europe since the Ice Age.  
The Britons nurtured representative government, recognizing 
individual freedoms in 1215 under the Magna Carta.  England and 
Wales were united in 1536.  The addition of Scotland in 1707 created 
Great Britain, renamed the United Kingdom in 1801 when Ireland 
was added. The twenty-six districts of Northern Ireland remain part 
of the U.K. 
During the eighteenth century, techniques of mass production 
gave birth in the Midlands to the industrial revolution.  Although 
losing many American colonies in the second half of the eighteenth 
century, Britain’s realm grew in Africa, the Caribbean, Asia, and the 
Mediterranean.  By 1990 more than forty former colonies had gained 
independence, most joining the Commonwealth of Nations. 
In 1979 newly elected Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher set out 
to reduce inflation and regain economic competitiveness.  In the 
1980s manufacturing productivity soared, much of the public sector 
was privatized, and trade unions were weakened.  Joblessness rose 
as plants closed, but North Sea oil revenues helped pay 
unemployment benefits.  As the British economy worsened, 
criticism of Thatcher mounted, and in 1990 she resigned and was 
succeeded by her Conservative Party colleague John Major.270  The 
1998 election of the Labour Party’s widely popular Tony Blair 
moved the kingdom back to center-left governance.  Blair’s policies 
of devolution have resulted in referenda leading to greater self-
governance for both Scotland and Wales, initiatives for local 
autonomy in Northern Ireland, and re-introduced municipal self-
governance for the City of London. 
 
Area Total: 244,820 sq. km 
Land: 241,590 sq. km 
Water: 3,230 sq. km 
Climate Temperate, with prevailing 
southwest winds over the 
North Atlantic Current 
 
 269 CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 263. 
 270 Id.  
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Terrain Mostly rugged hills and low 
mountains; level to rolling 
plains in east and southeast 
Natural Resources Coal, petroleum, natural gas, 
tin, limestone, iron ore, salt, 
clay, chalk, gypsum, lead, 
silica 
Population 59,511,464 (July 2000 est.) 
Ethnic Groups English 81.5%, Scottish 9.6%, 
Irish 2.4%, Welsh 1.9%, Ulster 
1.8%, West Indian, Indian, 
Pakistani, and other 2.8% 
Languages English, Welsh (about 26% of 
the population of Wales), 
Scottish form of Gaelic (about 
60,000 in Scotland) 
Legal System Common law tradition with 
early Roman and modern 
continental influences, with no 
judicial review of Acts of 
Parliament 
 
B.  Economy 
Over the past two decades the government has greatly reduced 
public ownership and contained the growth of social welfare 
programs.  Agriculture is intensive, highly mechanized, and 
efficient by European standards, producing about 60% of food needs 
with only 1% of the labor force.  The U.K. has large coal, natural gas, 
and oil reserves, with primary energy production accounting for 
10% of GDP, one of the highest shares of any industrial nation.  
Services, including banking, insurance, and business services, 
account for the largest proportion of GDP while industry continues 
to decline in importance, employing only 18% of the work force. 
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GDP Purchasing Power $1.29 trillion (1999 est.) 
GDP Real Growth Rate 1.9% (1999 est.) 
GDP Per Capita Purchasing 
Power Parity 
$21,800 (1999 est.) 
Population Below Poverty 
Line 
17% 
Labor Force 29.2 million (1999) 
Industrial Production Growth 
Rate 
-0.3% (1999) 
Exports $271 billion (F.O.B., 1998) 
Imports $305.9 billion (F.O.B, 1998) 
 
V.  REPUBLIC OF FRANCE271 
A.  Background 
The largest of European countries, excluding Russia and 
Ukraine, France is a leader in telecommunications, biotechnology, 
and aerospace. Sophia Antipolis, a booming high-tech complex on 
the Riviera, attracts scientists from throughout Europe. Coal and 
steel industries are concentrated in a northeastern rust belt.   
Paris has long been France’s cultural, political, and business 
epicenter.  In the early nineteenth century Napoleon Bonaparte 
divided large, traditional provinces into tiny, arbitrary departments. 
Recent congestion has spurred migration away from central Paris 
and its suburbs, while over-centralization of government has 
prompted the regrouping of departments into larger, regional units. 
Heavy losses in both world wars led to an independent defense 
doctrine, launched when President Charles de Gaulle withdrew 
from the military command of NATO in 1966. France maintains ties 
with its former colonies through aid, trade, and military pacts.  
Conservatism held sway until the election of François 
Mitterrand’s Socialist Party in 1981.  During Mitterrand’s fourteen 
years in power, he saw unemployment rise, the trade gap widen, 
and his bid to nationalize major industries and banks fail.  As the 
decade of the 1990s advanced and immigration became a heated 
issue, conservative forces again gained control. 
 
 271 Id. 
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Area Total: 547,030 sq. km 
Land: 545,630 sq. km 
Water: 1,400 sq. km 
Climate Generally cool winters and 
mild summers, but mild 
winters and hot summers 
along the Mediterranean 
Terrain Mostly flat plains or gently 
rolling hills in north and west; 
remainder is mountainous, 
especially Pyrenees in south, 
Alps in east 
Natural Resources Coal, iron ore, bauxite, fish, 
timber, zinc, potash 
Population 59,329,691 (July 2000 est.) 
Ethnic Groups Celtic and Latin with 
Teutonic, Slavic, North 
African, Indochinese, Basque 
minorities 
Languages French 100%, rapidly 
declining regional dialects and 
languages (Provencal, Breton, 
Alsatian, Corsican, Catalan, 
Basque, Flemish) 
Legal System Civil law system with 
indigenous concepts; review 
of administrative but not 
legislative acts 
B.  Economy 
One of the four West European trillion-dollar economies, 
France matches a growing services sector with a diversified 
industrial base and substantial agricultural resources.  Industry 
generates one-quarter of GDP and more than 80% of export 
earnings.  The government retains considerable influence over key 
segments of each sector, with majority ownership of railway, 
electricity, aircraft, and telecommunication firms.  It has been 
gradually relaxing its control over these sectors since the early 
1990s.  The government is slowly selling off its holdings in France 
Telecom, in Air France, and in the insurance, banking, and defense 
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industries.  A major exporter of wheat and dairy products, France is  
 
 
practically self-sufficient in agriculture. The economy expanded by 
3% in 1998, following a 2.3% gain in 1997, although high 
unemployment remains a major problem. 
 
GDP Purchasing Power $1.373 trillion (1999 est.) 
GDP Real Growth Rate 2.7% (1999 est.) 
GDP Per Capita Purchasing 
Power Parity 
$23,300 (1998 est.) 
Labor Force 25.4 million (1994) 
Industrial Production Growth 
Rate 
2% (1999) 
Exports $304.7 billion (F.O.B., 1999) 
Imports $280.8 billion (F.O.B., 1999) 
External Debt $117.6 billion (1996 est.) 
 
VI.  FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY272 
A.  Background 
The disparate Germanic principalities were set adrift by the 
Peace of Westphalia in 1648.  Real union eluded the Germans until 
1871, when the king of Prussia became kaiser of Germany.  The new 
emperor owed his empire to a cunning politician, Otto von 
Bismarck.  Bismarck’s creation had the makings of a colossus: 
industrial potential, prolific farms, an enviable army, and overseas 
possessions.  Defeat in World War I cost Germany its empire and 
left the nation staggering under heavy reparations. Inflation and 
unemployment hounded the shaky Weimar Republic.  By 1933 a 
demoralized population had turned to Adolf Hitler and the Nazi 
party.  Under Hitler, Germany rearmed and invaded neighboring 
countries, triggering the Second World War. 
When Germany surrendered in 1945, it lost eastern lands to the 
Soviet Union and Poland.  The Allies carved the rest of the country, 
and its capital, Berlin, into four zones.  Meant to be temporary, the 
partition persisted as the U.S.S.R. and other Allied powers clashed 
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over a communist or capitalist unified Germany.  In 1949 the 
American, French, and British zones formed the Federal Republic of 
Germany (West Germany), and the Soviet Union established the 
German Democratic Republic (East Germany).  The Berlin Wall 
went up in 1961.  When it came down three decades later, West 
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl navigated a year of tense 
diplomacy to fuse the halves of the nation. 
Today, with 82 million people, Germany contains the largest 
European population outside Russia.  Workers from Turkey, 
Yugoslavia, Italy, and Greece supplement the native labor force in 
making high-tech products and quality consumer goods for export.  
The deutsche mark, vigilantly guarded by an independent central 
bank, is one of the world’s strongest currencies.  Germany’s GNP 
places the country among the planet’s top five economies.  Germany 
now faces new challenges after reunification.  Closing inefficient 
state enterprises left almost half the former East German workforce 
without jobs.  Women lost extensive benefits, including twelve 
months of paid maternity leave and free day-care centers. 
Area Total: 356,910 sq. km 
Land: 349,520 sq. km 
Water: 7,390 sq. km 
Climate Temperate and marine; cool, 
cloudy, wet winters and 
summers; occasional warm, 
tropical wind; high relative 
humidity 
Terrain Lowlands in north, uplands in 
center, Bavarian Alps in south 
Natural Resources Iron ore, coal, potash, timber, 
lignite, uranium, copper, 
natural gas, salt, nickel 
Population 82,797,408 (July 2000 est.) 
Ethnic Groups German 91.5%, Turkish 2.4%, 
Italians 0.7%, Greeks 0.4%, 
Poles 0.4%, other 4.6% (made 
up largely of people fleeing 
the war in the former 
Yugoslavia) 
Languages German 
Legal System Civil law system with judicial 
review of legislative acts in the 
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Federal Constitutional Court 
 
B.  Economy 
Germany possesses the world’s third most powerful economy, 
with its capitalist market system tempered by generous welfare 
benefits.  On 1 January 1999, Germany and 10 other European Union 
countries launched the European Monetary Union (EMU) by 
permanently fixing their bilateral exchange rates and giving the new 
European Central Bank control over the zone’s monetary policy.  
Germans expect to have the new European currency, the euro, in 
pocket by 2002.  Domestic demand contributed to a moderate 
economic upswing in early 1998, although unemployment remains 
high.  Job-creation measures have helped superficially, but 
structural rigidities—like high wages and costly benefits—make 
unemployment a long-term, not just a cyclical, problem.  Over the 
long term, Germany faces budgetary problems—lower tax revenues 
and higher pension outlays—as its population ages.  Meanwhile, the 
German nation continues to wrestle with the integration of eastern 
Germany, whose adjustment may take decades to complete despite 
annual transfers from the west of roughly $100 billion a year.  The 
adoption of a common European currency and the general political 
and economic integration of Europe will bring major changes to the 
German economy in the early twenty-first  century. 
 
GDP Purchasing Power $1.864 trillion (1999 est.) 
GDP Real Growth Rate 1.5% (1999 est.) 
GDP Per Capita Purchasing 
Power Parity 
$22,700 (1999 est.) 
Labor Force 40.5 million (1999 est.) 
Industrial Production Growth 
Rate 
0.9% (1999) 
Exports $610 billion (F.O.B., 1999 est.) 
Imports $587 billion (F.O.B., 1999 est.) 
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VII.  FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL273 
A.  Background 
Brazil’s national development continues to center on its natural 
resources.  Road building, mining, and construction, often funded 
by the World Bank, the European Union, and Japan, provide 
opportunities but at great cost.  Construction of Highway BR-364 
carried many farmers to Rondônia, where the soil lost productivity 
when stripped of its nutrient-rich forest cover.  Controversy over the 
opening of frontiers has placed some highway projects on hold.  
During the 1980s gold miners in Roraima polluted rivers with 
mercury and invaded the territory of the Yanomami, an indigenous 
people.  As Indians succumb to imported diseases, their cultures 
also die, and knowledge such as the medicinal value of tropical 
plants is lost.  In 1991 the government demarcated 93,000 square 
kilometers for the Yanomami. 
Havoc in the forests mirrors disarray in the capital, Brasília.  
Years of military dictatorship gave way to civilian rule in 1985, 
followed by democratic elections in 1989.  Though reforms have 
begun, progress is slowed by constitutional questions, political 
corruption, and an unsteady economy.  Brazil’s foreign debt is the 
largest among developing nations, and where seventy percent of the 
citizenry struggle to meet minimal nutritional needs.  These 
problems have revived the secessionist movement by the more 
developed southern states of Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, 
Paraná, and São Paulo. 
In June 1992 Rio hosted the first United Nations Earth Summit, 
which brought together world leaders to discuss conservation 
treaties. 
 
Area Total: 8,511,965 sq. km 
Land: 8,456,510 sq. km 
Water: 55,455 sq. km 
Climate Mostly tropical, but temperate 
in south 
Terrain Mostly flat to rolling lowlands 
in north; some plains, hills, 
mountains, and narrow 
coastal belt 
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Natural Resources Bauxite, gold, iron ore, 
manganese, nickel, 
phosphates, platinum, tin, 
uranium, petroleum, 
hydropower, timber 
Population 172,860,370 (July 2000 est.) 
Ethnic Groups White (includes Portuguese, 
German, Italian, Spanish, 
Polish) 55%, mixed white and 
black 38%, black 6%, other 
(includes Japanese, Arab, 
American Indian) 1% 
Languages Portuguese (official), Spanish, 
English, French 
Legal System Based on Roman codes 
 
B.  Economy 
Possessing large and well-developed agricultural, mining, 
manufacturing, and service sectors, Brazil’s economy outweighs that 
of all other South American countries and is expanding its presence 
in world markets.  Prior to the institution of a stabilization plan 
known as the Plano Real or Real Plan in mid 1994, stratospheric 
inflation rates had disrupted economic activity and discouraged 
foreign investment.  Since then, tight monetary policy has brought 
inflation under control, with consumer prices increased by 2% in 
1998 compared to more than 1,000% in 1994.  At the same time, GDP 
growth slowed from 5.7% in 1994 to about 3.0% in 1997 due to 
tighter credit.  The Real Plan faced its strongest challenge in 1998, as 
the world financial crisis caused investors to more closely examine 
the country’s structural weaknesses.  The most severe spillover for 
Brazil followed Russia’s debt default in August 1998, which created 
unrelenting pressure on the currency, which forced the country to 
hike annual interest rates to 50%.  After crafting a fiscal adjustment 
program and pledging progress on structural reform, Brazil 
received a $41.5 billion IMF-led international support program in 
November 1998.  Capital continued to leave the country, and 
investors, concerned about the rising mountain of debt and currency 
widely-viewed as overvalued, stayed on the sidelines.  In January 
1999, Brazil made an abrupt shift of course in exchange rate policy, 
abandoning the strong currency anti-inflation anchor of the Real 
Plan. 
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GDP Purchasing Power $1.057 trillion (1999 est.) 
GDP Real Growth Rate 0.8% (1999 est.) 
GDP Per Capita Purchasing 
Power Parity 
$6,150 (1999 est.) 
Population Below Poverty 
Line 
17.4% (1990 est.) 
Labor Force 74 million (1997 est.) 
Industrial Production Growth 
Rate 
-2.6% (1999 est.) 
Exports $46.9 billion (F.O.B., 1999) 
Imports $48.7 billion (F.O.B., 1998) 
External Debt $200 billion (1999) 
VIII.  UNITED MEXICAN STATES274 
A.  Background 
A 3,115-kilometer (1,936-mile) common border, commerce, and 
tourism link the world’s largest Spanish-speaking country to the 
world’s largest economic power.  Mexico sends half its oil exports, 
drawn from reserves ranked eighth worldwide, to its northern 
neighbor.  The United States returns manufactured goods and 
foodstuffs.  Agriculture, limited by rugged topography and uneven 
rainfall, remains an important employer, although price controls 
have reduced farm earnings and wage controls have lowered the 
standard of living.  The nation’s system of communal farms, or 
ejidos, was reformed in 1992 to promote private investment and 
large-scale agriculture.  Farmers grow twenty percent of U.S. winter 
vegetables. 
Tax reform, privatization of state-run industries, more open 
trade policies, drastic austerity measures, and restructuring the 
hundred-billion-dollar foreign debt began to improve 
competitiveness and boost exports in the early 1990s.  To create new 
jobs and further spur the economy, a free-trade agreement with 
Canada and the United States was implemented in 1994.  
Overspending and reckless lending practices, however, helped 
precipitate a banking and credit crisis in 1995. 
With more than 15 million people, greater Mexico City is one of 
the world’s largest metropolitan areas.  Stringent environmental 
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restrictions have been enacted to address increasingly dangerous 
levels of air and water pollution. 
Mexico’s declining birthrate promises some relief from the 
crushing pressure of its population, expected to exceed a hundred 
million by the year 2000.  One-third of all Mexicans are younger 
than fifteen.  The flood of illegal immigrants across the border taxed 
relations with the United States.  During the 1980s Mexicans seeking 
work made more than 20 million illegal border crossings. 
Tourism, along with petroleum revenues, is a leading earner of 
foreign exchange.  About ninety percent of the more than six million 
visitors come from the U.S. and Canada. 
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Area Total: 1,972,550 sq. km 
Land: 1,923,040 sq. km 
Water: 49,510 sq. km 
Climate Varies from tropical to desert 
Terrain High, rugged mountains; low 
coastal plains; high plateaus; 
desert 
Natural Resources Petroleum, silver, copper, 
gold, lead, zinc, natural gas, 
timber 
Population 100,349,766 (July 2000 est.) 
Ethnic Groups Mestizo (Amerindian-Spanish) 
60%, Amerindian or 
predominantly Amerindian 
30%, white 9%, other 1% 
Languages Spanish, various Mayan, 
Nahuatl, and other regional 
indigenous languages 
Legal System Mixture of U.S. constitutional 
theory and civil law, with 




Mexico has a free market economy with a mixture of modern 
and outmoded industry and agriculture, increasingly dominated by 
the private sector.  The number of state-owned enterprises in 
Mexico has fallen from more than 1,000 in 1982 to fewer than 200 in 
1998.  A strong export sector helped to cushion the economy’s 
decline in 1995 and led the recovery in 1996 and 1997.  In 1998, 
private consumption became the leading driver of growth, which 
was accompanied by increased employment and higher wages.  
Mexico still needs to overcome many structural problems as it 
strives to modernize its economy and raise living standards.  
Income distribution is very unequal, with the top 20% of income 
earners accounting for 55% of income.  Trade with the United States 
and Canada has nearly doubled since NAFTA was implemented in 
1994. Mexico is pursuing additional trade agreements with most 
countries in Latin America and with the EU to lessen its dependence 
on the United States. 
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GDP Purchasing Power $865.5 billion (1999 est.) 
GDP Real Growth Rate 3.7% (1999 est.) 
Population Below Poverty 
Line 
27% (1998 est.) 
Labor Force 38.6 million (1999) 
Industrial Production Growth 
Rate 
4% (1999 est.) 
Exports $136.8 billion (F.O.B., 1999) 
Imports $142.1 billion (F.O.B., 1999) 
External Debt $155.8 billion (1999) 
 
IX.  ARGENTINE REPUBLIC275 
 
A.  Background 
Modern Argentina enjoys a high literacy rate, a low birthrate 
and rare  infant mortality;  today, most Argentines consider 
themselves part of the middle class.  The recent past, however, has 
been tumultuous.  During the “dirty war” of the late 1970s more 
than 10,000 people disappeared.  Defeat by Britain during the 1982 
Falkland Islands war loosened the military dictatorship’s 
stranglehold on democracy.  The Radical Party relinquished control 
to the Peronist party in 1989, the first transfer of power from one 
elected official to another in sixty years. 
Since the 1990s, Argentina has developed greater freedom of 
the press, tolerance of opposition, and increased foreign investment.  
Privatization of state firms has reduced government debt by seven 
billion dollars, and the inflation rate has plummeted.  
Unemployment, however, plagues the economy, even as the nation 
enjoys the continent’s highest per capita income. 
 
Area Total: 2,766,890 sq. km 
Land: 2,736,690 sq. km 
Water: 30,200 sq. km 
Climate Mostly temperate, with arid 
temperatures in southeast; 
subantarctic climate marks the 
southwest 
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Terrain Rich plains of the Pampas in 
northern half, flat to rolling 
plateau of Patagonia in south, 
rugged Andes along western 
border 
Natural Resources Fertile plains of the pampas, 
lead, zinc, tin, copper, iron ore, 
manganese, petroleum, 
uranium 
Population 36,955,182 (July 2000 est.) 
Ethnic Groups White 85%, mestizo, 
Amerindian, or other 
nonwhite groups 15% 
Languages Spanish (official), English, 
Italian, German, French 
Legal System Mixture of U.S. and West 
European legal systems; has 
not accepted compulsory ICJ 
jurisdiction 
 
B.  Economy 
In 1989, the Argentine Republic held huge external debts, 
inflation hovered around 200% per month, and industrial output 
was plummeting.  To combat the economic crisis, the government 
embarked on a path of trade liberalization, deregulation, and 
privatization.  In 1991, it implemented radical monetary reforms 
which pegged the peso to the U.S. dollar and limited the growth in 
the monetary base by law to the growth in reserves.  Inflation fell 
sharply in subsequent years.  The Mexican peso crisis produced a 
severe, but short-lived, recession in 1995.  A series of reforms to 
bolster the domestic banking system followed, and Real GDP 
growth recovered strongly, reaching almost 9% in 1997.  In 1998, 
increasing investor anxiety over Brazil, its largest trading partner, 
produced the highest domestic interest rates in more than three 
years and slowed growth to 4.3%.  Despite the relatively high level 
of growth in recent years, double-digit unemployment rates have 
persisted, largely because of rigidities in Argentina’s labor laws. 
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GDP Purchasing Power $367 billion (1999 est.) 
GDP Real Growth Rate -3% (1999 est.) 
GDP Per Capita Purchasing 
Power Parity 
$10,000 (1999 est.) 
Population Below Poverty 
Line 
36% (1998 est.) 
Labor Force 15 million (1999) 
Industrial Production Growth 
Rate 
-7% (1999 est.) 
Exports $23 billion (F.O.B., 1999 est.) 
Imports $25 billion (C.I.F., 1999 est.) 
External Debt $149 billion (1999 est.) 
 
X.  REPUBLIC OF CHILE276 
A.  Background 
Chileans once enjoyed Latin America’s longest tradition of 
political stability and civil liberty.  In 1973, however, a coup 
overthrew Salvador Allende’s Marxist government and ushered in 
16 years of dictatorship under General Augusto Pinochet.  
Democracy was restored in 1989.  Privatization of industries and 
increased agricultural exports have boosted the economy.  The 
Chuquicamata and Escondida copper mines rank as the world’s 
largest.  Oil from the Strait of Magellan eases reliance on imported 
fuel, and negotiations with Argentina are under way for a trans-
Andean natural gas pipeline. 
 
Area Total: 756,950 sq. km  
Land: 748,800 sq. km  
Water: 8,150 sq. km  
Climate Temperate; desert in north; 
cool and damp in south 
Terrain Low coastal mountains; fertile 
central valley; rugged Andes 
in east 
Natural Resources Copper, timber, iron ore, 
nitrates, precious metals, 
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molybdenum 
Population 15,153,797 (July 2000 est.) 
 
Ethnic Groups White and white-Amerindian 





Legal System Based on Code of 1857 derived 
from Spanish law and 
subsequent codes influenced 
by French and Austrian law 
with judicial review of 
legislative acts in the Supreme 
Court 
 
B.  Economy 
Chile has a prosperous, essentially free market economy.  
Civilian governments took over from the military in March 1990, 
and have continued to reduce the government’s role in the economy 
while shifting the emphasis of public spending toward social 
programs.  Growth in real GDP averaged more than 7.0% in 1991-97 
but fell to about half of that average in 1998 because of spillover 
from the global financial crisis.  Inflation has been on a downward 
trend and hit a 60-year low in 1998.  Chile’s currency and foreign 
reserves also are strong, as sustained foreign capital inflows—
including significant direct investment—have more than offset 
current account deficits and public debt buy-backs.  The Chilean 
economy remains largely dependent on a few sectors, including 
particularly copper mining, fishing, and forestry.  Success in 
meeting the government’s goal of sustained annual economic 
growth of 5% depends largely on world prices for these 
commodities, continued foreign investor confidence, and the 
government’s ability to maintain a conservative fiscal stance.  In 
1996, Chile became an associate member of MERCOSUR277 and 
concluded a free trade agreement with Canada.  The inauguration of 
Ricardo Lagos in March 2000, succeeding Eduardo Frei, will keep 
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the presidency in the hands of the center-left Concertacion coalition 
that has held office since the return of civilian rule in 1990. 
 
GDP Purchasing Power $185.1 billion (1999 est.) 
GDP Real Growth Rate -1% (1999 est.) 
GDP Per Capita Purchasing 
Power Parity 
$12,400 (1999 est.) 
Population Below Poverty 
Line 
22% (1998 est.) 
Labor Force 5.8 million (1999 est.) 
Industrial Production Growth 
Rate 
-1.3% (1999 est.) 
Exports $15.6 billion (F.O.B., 1999) 
Imports $13.9 billion (C.I.F., 1999) 
External Debt $39 billion (1999) 
 
XI.  REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA278 
A.  Background 
From 1948 to 1991 South Africa’s political system was 
dominated by apartheid, a policy of segregation that isolated blacks, 
who outnumber whites by six to one, in so-called homelands and 
overcrowded townships.  In 1989 a reform-minded government, 
spurred by international economic sanctions as well as domestic 
protests, began the process of dismantling apartheid. 
By the middle of 1991 all remaining apartheid legislation was 
revoked, including the Population Registration Act, which classified 
South Africans by race and was widely considered the cornerstone 
of apartheid.  In March 1992 white South Africans voted in favor of 
negotiations aimed at replacing the constitution with a nonracial 
one, accomplished in 1993.  The first multiracial parliament was 
elected in 1994, and Nelson Mandela—winner of the Nobel Peace 
Prize in 1993 in conjunction with former President Frederik W. de 
Klerk—became the new president; black homelands were abolished.  
The country soon regained active membership in the British 
Commonwealth and the United Nations. 
 
 
 278 CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 263.. 
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Area Total: 1,219,912 sq. km 
Land: 1,219,912 sq. km 
Water: 0 sq. km 
Climate Mostly semiarid; subtropical 
along east coast 
Terrain Vast interior plateau rimmed 
by rugged hills and narrow 
coastal plain 
Natural Resources Gold, chromium, antimony, 
coal, iron ore, manganese, 
nickel, phosphates, tin, 
uranium, gem diamonds, 
platinum, copper, vanadium, 
salt, natural gas 
Natural Hazards Prolonged droughts 
Environment Current issues: lack of 
important arterial rivers or 
lakes requires extensive water 
conservation and control 
Population 43,421,021 (July 2000 est.) 
Ethnic Groups Black 75.2%, white 13.6% 
Languages Eleven official languages, 
including Afrikaans, English, 
Ndebele, Pedi, Sotho, Swazi, 
Tsonga, Tswana, Venda, 
Xhosa, Zulu 
Legal System Based on Roman-Dutch law 
and English common law 
B.  Economy 
South Africa is a middle-income, developing country with an 
abundant supply of resources, well-developed financial, legal, 
communications, energy, and transport sectors, a stock exchange 
that ranks among the ten largest in the world, and a modern 
infrastructure supporting an efficient distribution of goods to major 
urban centers throughout the region.  However, growth has not 
been strong enough to cut into the 30% unemployment, and 
daunting economic problems remain from the apartheid era, 
especially the problems of poverty and lack of economic 
empowerment among the disadvantaged groups.  Other problems 
are crime, corruption, and HIV/AIDS.  At the start of 2000, 
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President Mbeki vowed to promote economic growth and foreign 
investment by relaxing restrictive labor laws, stepping up the pace 
of privatization, and cutting unneeded governmental spending.  His 
policies face strong opposition from organized labor. 
 
GDP Purchasing Power $296.1 billion (1999 est.) 
GDP Real Growth Rate 0.6% (1999 est.) 
GDP Per Capita Purchasing 
Power Parity 
$6,900 (1999 est.) 
Labor Force 15 million economically active 
(1997) 
Industrial Production Growth 
Rate 
-5% (1998 est.) 
Exports $28 billion (F.O.B., 1999 est.) 
Imports $26 billion (F.O.B., 1999 est.) 
External Debt $23.7 billion (1998 est.) 
XII.  ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT279 
A.  Background 
Although a unified state for more than 5,000 years, Egypt’s 
rapidly growing population burdens an economy weakened during 
the past two decades by inflation, unemployment, and massive 
foreign debt.  A sharp increase in wheat prices (Egypt is a large 
importer) hit hard in the late 1980s.  The main sources of foreign 
currency are remittances from workers abroad, Suez Canal fees, 
tourism, and oil—all hurt by the 1990-91 Persian Gulf war.  The 
Aswan High Dam, completed in 1971, provides hydroelectricity, as 
well as a controlled water supply for year-round irrigation and 
desert reclamation.  Harnessing the Nile, however, has reduced silt 
deposits downstream, increasing erosion and soil salinity. Farmers, 
who make up a third of the labor force, rely on irrigation to grow 
cotton. 
Gamal Abdel Nasser helped bring decades of British control to 
an end in 1953.  In 1970 he was succeeded by Anwar Sadat, who 
liberalized the economy, distanced Egypt from the Soviet Union, 
and pursued peace with Israel.  Muslim fundamentalists 
assassinated Sadat in 1981.  President Hosni Mubarak has reclaimed 
Egypt’s strength in the Arab world with the return of the Arab 
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League to Cairo. 
 
Area Total: 1,001,450 sq. km 
Land: 995,450 sq. km 
Water: 6,000 sq. km 
Climate Desert; hot, dry summers with 
moderate winters 
Terrain Vast desert plateau 
interrupted by Nile valley and 
delta 
Natural Resources Petroleum, natural gas, iron 
ore, phosphates, manganese, 
limestone, gypsum, talc, 
asbestos, lead, zinc 
 




Ethnic Groups Eastern Hamitic stock 
(Egyptians, Bedouins, and 
Berbers) 99%, Greek, Nubian, 
Armenian, other European 
(primarily Italian and French) 
1% 
Languages Arabic (official), English and 
French  
Legal System Based on English common 
law, Islamic law, and 
Napoleonic codes with judicial 
review by Supreme Court, and 
administrative overview by 
the Council of State 
B.  Economy 
At the end of the 1980s, Egypt faced problems of low 
productivity and poor economic management, compounded by the 
adverse social effects of excessive population growth, high inflation, 
and massive urban overcrowding.  In the face of these pressures, in 
1991 Egypt undertook wide-ranging macroeconomic stabilization 
and structural reform measures.  This reform effort has been 
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supported by three IMF arrangements, the last of which expired in 
September 1998. 
Egypt’s reform efforts—and its participation in the Gulf war 
coalition—also led to massive debt relief under the Paris Club 
arrangements.  Substantial progress has been made in improving 
macroeconomic performance.  Cairo tamed inflation, slashed budget 
deficits, and built up foreign reserves to an all-time high.  Although 
the pace of structural reforms—such as privatization and new 
business legislation—has been slower than envisioned under the 
IMF program, Egypt’s steps toward a more market-oriented 
economy have prompted increased foreign investment.  The 
November 1997 massacre of foreign tourists in Luxor affected 
tourism enough to slow the GDP growth rate for 1998 compared to 
earlier projections.  Increased gas exports are a major plus factor in 
future growth. 
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GDP Purchasing Power $200 billion (1999 est.) 
GDP Real Growth Rate 5% (1999 est.) 
GDP Per Capita Purchasing 
Power Parity 
$3,000 (1999 est.) 
Labor Force 19 million (1999 est.) 
 
Industrial Production Growth 
Rate 
5% (1999 est.) 
Exports $4.6 billion (F.O.B., 1999 est.) 
Imports $15.8 billion (F.O.B., 1999 est.) 
External Debt $30 billion (1999 est.) 
 
XIII.  FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA280 
A.  Background 
Africa’s most populous nation embraces 250 ethnic groups.  A 
century of British rule ended in 1960.  After independence ethnic 
tensions increased, deepened by the rift between the poor north and 
more prosperous south.  Civil war raged from 1967 to 1970, when 
the Ibo fought unsuccessfully for autonomy as the Republic of 
Biafra. The establishment of separate states—30 by 1992—has 
helped accommodate diverse peoples. 
By the mid-1980s over reliance on oil had brought Nigeria close 
to bankruptcy.  A military regime came to power, intent on 
liberalizing the economy and eliminating corruption.  President 
Ibrahim Babangida promised a return to civilian rule, but the 1993 
elections were annulled and he was forced to resign. 
 
Area Total: 923,770 sq. km 
Land: 910,770 sq. km 
Water: 13,000 sq. km 
Climate Varies; equatorial in south, 
tropical in center, arid in north 
Terrain Southern lowlands merge into 
central hills and plateaus; 
mountains in southeast, plains 
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in north 
Natural Resources Petroleum, tin, columbite, iron 
ore, coal, limestone, lead, zinc, 
natural gas 
Population 123,337822 (July 2000 est.) 
Ethnic Groups Hausa, Fulani, Yoruba, Ibo, 
Ijaw, Kanuri, Ibibio, Tiv 
 
Languages English (official), Hausa, 
Yoruba, Ibo, Fulani 
Legal System Based on English common 
law, Islamic law, and tribal 
law 
B.  Economy 
The oil-rich Nigerian economy continues to be hobbled by 
political instability, corruption, and poor macroeconomic 
management.  Nigeria’s unpopular military rulers have failed to 
make significant progress in diversifying the economy away from 
over dependence on the capital intensive oil sector which provides 
30% of GDP, 95% of foreign exchange earnings, and about 80% of 
budgetary revenues.  The government’s resistance to initiating 
greater transparency and accountability in managing the country’s 
multibillion dollar oil earnings continues to limit economic growth 
and prevent an agreement with the IMF and bilateral creditors on a 
staff-monitored program and debt relief.  The largely subsistence 
agricultural sector has failed to keep up with rapid population 
growth, and Nigeria, once a large net exporter of food, now must 
import food. 
 
GDP Purchasing Power $110.5 billion (1999 est.) 
GDP Real Growth Rate 2.7% (1999 est.) 
GDP Per Capita Purchasing 
Power Parity 
$970 (1999 est.) 
Population Below Poverty 
Line 
34.1% (1992-93 est.) 
Labor Force 42.844 million 
Industrial Production Growth 
Rate 
4.1% (1996) 
Exports $3.1 billion (F.O.B., 1999) 
Imports $10 billion (F.O.B., 1999) 
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External Debt $29 billion (1999 est.) 
XIV.  REPUBLIC OF KENYA281 
A.  Background 
Free enterprise and a measure of political debate helped make 
Kenya one of Africa’s most stable nations after it achieved 
independence from Britain in 1963.  Forty ethnic groups, including 
Kikuyu farmers and Masai cattle herders, crowd the countryside, 
still home to three-quarters of Kenya’s people.  The population, 
swelling by more than three percent per year, could double by the 
early twenty-first century.  Intense competition for arable land 
drives thousands to cities, where unemployment is high. 
 
Area Total: 582,650 sq. km 
Land: 569,250 sq. km 
Water: 13,400 sq. km 
Climate Varies from tropical along 
coast to arid in interior 
Terrain Low plains rise to central 
highlands bisected by Great 
Rift Valley; fertile plateau in 
west 
Natural Resources Gold, limestone, soda ash, salt 
barites, rubies, fluorspar, 
garnets, wildlife 
Population 30,339,770 (July 2000 est.) 
Ethnic Groups Kikuyu 22%, Luhya 14%, Luo 
13%, Kalenjin 12%, Kamba 
11%, Kisii 6%, Meru 6%, other 
African 15%, non-African 
(Asian, European, and Arab) 
1% 
 
Languages English (official), Swahili 
(official), numerous 
indigenous languages 
Legal System Based on English common 
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law, tribal law, and Islamic 
law with judicial review in the 
High Court 
 
B.  Economy 
Since 1993, the government of Kenya has implemented a 
program of economic liberalization and reform.  Steps have 
included the removal of import licensing and price controls, 
removal of foreign exchange controls, fiscal and monetary restraint, 
and reduction of the public sector through privatizing publicly 
owned companies and downsizing the civil service.  With the 
support of the World Bank, IMF, and other donors, these reforms 
have led to a turnaround in economic performance following a 
period of negative growth in the early 1990s.  Kenya’s real GDP 
grew at 5% in 1995 and 4% in 1996, and inflation remained under 
control.  Growth slowed in 1997-98.  Political violence damaged the 
tourist industry, and the IMF allowed Kenya’s Enhanced Structural 
Adjustment Program to lapse due to the government’s failure to 
enact reform conditions and to adequately address public sector 
corruption.  Long-term barriers to development include electricity 
shortages, the government’s continued and inefficient dominance of 
key sectors, endemic corruption, and the country’s high population 
growth rate. 
 
GDP Purchasing Power $45.1 billion (1999 est.) 
GDP Real Growth Rate 1.5% (1999 est.) 
GDP Per Capita Purchasing 
Power Parity 
$1,600 (1999 est.) 
Population Below Poverty 
Line 
42% (1992 est.) 
Labor Force 9.2 million (1998 est.) 
Industrial Production Growth 
Rate 
1% (1999 est.) 
Exports $2.2 billion (F.O.B., 1999 est.) 
Imports $3.3 billion (F.O.B., 1999 est.) 
External Debt $6.5 billion (1998) 
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XV.  REPUBLIC OF INDIA282 
A.  Background 
Hindu culture evolved out of the mingling of indigenous 
Dravidian peoples and Aryan-speaking nomads who arrived from 
Central Asia in 1500 B.C.  Islam was introduced by Arabs early in 
the eighth century A.D.  In 1526 Moguls from Samarkand founded a 
feudal empire that flourished until peasant uprisings in the 18th 
century opened the door to Western influence.  Until the mid-
twentieth century the subcontinent was the pride of the British 
Empire.  Guided by Mahatma Gandhi, Indians won nationhood in 
1947.  From British rule they inherited deep poverty but also 
parliamentary government, the English language, and a far-flung 
rail system, which helped knit the multiethnic country into a 
secular, stable democracy. 
Today, India faces a host of problems including a ponderous 
bureaucracy, illiteracy, and a birthrate that adds more than 27 
million babies each year to the world’s second largest population.  
Yet in the 1980s an expanding middle class made consumer 
advertising a new growth industry.  Farmers, using the techniques 
of the green revolution, produce enough wheat and rice to feed the 
nation, whose economy ranked in the world’s top 16 in 1993. 
 
Area Total: 3,287,590 sq. km 
Land: 2,973,190 sq. km 
Water: 314,400 sq. km 
Climate Varies from tropical monsoon 
in south to temperate in north 
Terrain Upland plain (Deccan Plateau) 
in south, flat to rolling plain 
along the Ganges, deserts in 
west, Himalayas in north 
Natural Resources Coal (fourth-largest reserves 
in the world), iron ore, 
manganese, mica, bauxite, 
titanium ore, chromite, natural 
gas, diamonds, petroleum, 
limestone 
Population 1,014,003,817 (July 2000 est.) 
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Ethnic Groups Indo-Aryan 72%, Dravidian 
25%, Mongoloid and other 3% 
Languages English , Hindi (national 
language) Bengali (official), 
Telugu (official), Marathi 
(official), Tamil (official), Urdu 
(official), Gujarati (official), 
Malayalam (official), Kannada 
(official), Oriya (official), 
Punjabi (official), Assamese 
(official), Kashmiri (official), 
Sindhi (official), Sanskrit 
(official), Hindustani  
Legal System Based on English common law 
with limited judicial review of 
legislative acts 
 
B.  Economy 
India’s economy encompasses traditional village farming, 
modern agriculture, handicrafts, a wide range of modern industries, 
and a multitude of support services. 67% of India’s labor force work 
in agriculture, which contributes 25% of the country’s GDP.  
Production, trade, and investment reforms since 1991 have provided 
new opportunities for Indian businesspersons and an estimated 300 
million middle class consumers.  New Delhi has avoided debt 
rescheduling, attracted foreign investment, and revived confidence 
in India’s economic prospects since 1991.  Many of the country’s 
fundamentals—including savings rates (26% of GDP) and reserves 
(now about $30 billion)—are healthy.  India’s exports, currency, and 
foreign institutional investment were affected by the East Asian 
crisis in late 1997 and 1998; but capital account controls, a low ratio 
of short-term debt to reserves, and enhanced supervision of the 
financial sector helped insulate it from near term 
balance-of-payments problems.  Exports fell 5% in 1998 mainly 
because of the fall in Asian currencies relative to the rupee.  Energy, 
telecommunications, and transportation bottlenecks continue to 
constrain growth.  A series of weak coalition governments have 
lacked the political strength to push reforms forward to address 
these and other problems 
 
GDP Purchasing Power $1.805 trillion (1999 est.) 
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GDP Real Growth Rate 5.45% (1999 est.) 
GDP Per Capita Purchasing 
Power Parity 
$1,800 (1999 est.) 
Population Below Poverty 
Line 
35% (1994 est.) 
Industrial Production Growth 
Rate 
6% (1999 est.) 
Exports $36.3 billion (F.O.B., 1999 est.) 
Imports $50.2 billion (F.O.B., 1999 est.) 
External Debt $98 billion (March 1999) 
 
XVI.  JAPAN283 
A.  Background 
Among the top three exporters of manufactured goods, the 
nation had the second largest GNP in 1993, after that of the United 
States.  Aggressive expansion across the Pacific led to war with the 
United States in 1941.  Defeat ended Japan’s dream of ruling Asia, 
and the U.S. occupation imposed a parliamentary constitution, free 
labor unions, and stringent land reform.  Despite a lack of raw 
materials, the economy was revived with the help of U.S. grants, 
high rates of labor productivity, personal savings, and capital 
investment. 
Huge trade surpluses, however, have heightened friction with 
the United States and Western Europe, provoking demands for 
Japan to open its doors wider to foreign companies.  In response the 
country has reoriented its economy to satisfy domestic demand and 
has invested massively overseas. 
 
Area Total: 377,835 sq. km 
Land: 374,744 sq. km 
Water: 3,091 sq. km 
Climate Varies from tropical in south 
to cool temperate in north 
Terrain Mostly rugged and 
mountainous 
Natural Resources Negligible mineral resources, 
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fish 
Population 126,549,976 (July 2000 est.) 
Ethnic Groups Japanese 99.4%, other 0.6% 
(mostly Korean) 
Languages Japanese 
Legal System Modeled after European civil 
law system with 
English-American influence; 
judicial review of legislative 
acts in the Supreme Court  
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B.  Economy 
One notable characteristic of the economy is the working 
together of manufacturers, suppliers, and distributors in closely knit 
groups called keiretsu.  A second basic, but eroding feature has been 
the guarantee of lifetime employment for a substantial portion of the 
urban labor force.  Industry, the most important sector of the 
economy, is heavily dependent on imported raw materials and 
fuels.  The much smaller agricultural sector is highly subsidized and 
protected, with crop yields among the highest in the world.   
Usually self-sufficient in rice, Japan must import about 50% of 
its requirements of other grain and fodder crops.  Japan maintains 
one of the world’s largest fishing fleets and accounts for nearly 15% 
of the global catch. For three decades overall real economic growth 
had been spectacular: a 10% average in the 1960s, a 5% average in 
the 1970s, and a 4% average in the 1980s.  Growth slowed markedly 
in 1992-95 largely because of the aftereffects of over-investment 
during the late 1980s.  Growth picked up to 3.9% in 1996, largely a 
reflection of stimulating fiscal and monetary policies as well as low 
rates of inflation.  In 1997-98 Japan experienced a wrenching 
recession, centered about financial difficulties in the banking system 
and real estate markets and exacerbated by rigidities in corporate 
structures and labor markets.  In early 1999, output started to 
stabilize as emergency government spending begins to take hold. 
 
GDP Purchasing Power $2.95 trillion (1999 est.) 
GDP Real Growth Rate 0.3% (1999 est.) 
GDP Per Capita Purchasing 
Power Parity 
$23,400 (1999 est.) 
Labor Force 67.76 million (November 1999) 
Industrial Production Growth 
Rate 
-0.1% (1998) 
Exports $413 billion (F.O.B., 1999 est.) 
 
Imports $306 billion (C.I.F., 1999 est.) 
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XVII.  REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA284 
 
A.  Background 
The world’s fourth most populous nation, Indonesia is the 
largest Islamic country, with some 173 million Muslims. About 300 
ethnic groups speak 365 local dialects on more than 13,660 islands. 
After independence from the Netherlands in 1949, the republic 
confronted a high birthrate, low productivity, and illiteracy—areas 
in which progress has since been made.  In the late 1980s mining, 
manufacturing, and tourism absorbed many of the two million who 
entered the job market each year.  Efforts are being made to reduce 
dependence on petroleum and natural gas, which in 1993 accounted 
for close to 30 percent of export earnings.  Logging and rice 
cultivation continue to consume the rain forest—the world’s second 
largest, after Brazil’s. 
Current issues include implementing IMF-mandated reforms 
(particularly restructuring and recapitalizing the insolvent banking 
sector), effecting a transition to a popularly elected government, 
addressing longstanding grievances over the role of the ethnic 
Chinese business class and charges of cronyism and corruption, 
alleged human rights violations by the military, the role of the 
military and religion in politics, and growing pressures for some 
form of independence or autonomy by Aceh, Irian Jaya, and East 
Timor. 
 
Area Total: 1,919,440 sq. km 
Land: 1,826,440 sq. km 
Water: 93,000 sq. km 
Climate Tropical; hot, humid; more 
moderate in highlands 
Terrain Mostly coastal lowlands; 
larger islands have interior 
mountains 
Natural Resources Petroleum, tin, natural gas, 
nickel, timber, bauxite, copper, 
fertile soils, coal, gold, silver 
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Population 224,784,210 (July 2000 est.) 
Ethnic Groups Javanese 45%, Sundanese 14%, 
Madurese 7.5%, coastal 
Malays 7.5%, other 26% 
Languages Bahasa Indonesia (official, 
modified form of Malay), 
English, Dutch 
Legal System Based on Roman-Dutch law, 
but substantially modified by 
indigenous concepts and a 
new criminal procedures code 
 
B.  Economy 
The Indonesian economy stabilized in 1999, following the sharp 
contraction and high inflation of 1998.  By following tight monetary 
policy, the government reduced inflation from over 70% in 1998 to 
2% in 1999.  Although interest rates spiked as high as 70% in 
response to the monetary contraction, they fell rapidly to the 10% to 
15% range.  The economy stopped its free-fall as GDP showed some 
growth in the second half of 1999, although GDP for the year as a 
whole showed no growth.  The government managed to recapitalize 
a handful of private banks and has begun recapitalizing the state-
owned banking sector.  New lending, however, remains almost 
unavailable as banks continue to be wary of issuing new debt in an 
environment where little progress has been made in restructuring 
the huge burden of outstanding debts.  IMF payments were 
suspended late in 1999 as the result of evidence that a private bank 
had illegally funneled payments it received from the government to 
one of the political parties.  The government has forecast growth of 
3.8% for fiscal year 2000-2001.  The spread of sectarian violence and 
continuing dissatisfaction with the pace of bank and debt 
restructuring will make it difficult for Indonesia to attract the 
private investment necessary to achieve this goal. 
 
GDP Purchasing Power $610 billion (1999 est.) 
GDP Real Growth Rate 0% (1999 est.) 
GDP Per Capita Purchasing 
Power Parity 
$2,800 (1999 est.) 
Labor Force 88 million (1998) 
Industrial Production Growth 1.5% (1998 est.) 
KELLY FORMATTED.DOC 4/18/2001  10:35 AM 
2000] SECURITY COUNCIL PERMANENT MEMBERSHIP 405 
Rate 
Exports $48 billion (F.O.B., 1999 est.) 
Imports $24 billion (C.I.F., 1999 est.) 
External Debt $140 billion (1998 est.) 
 
XVIII.  ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN285 
 
A.  Background 
The military has loomed large in Pakistan, the western portion 
of a bifurcated country created for Muslims when the British 
relinquished predominantly Hindu India in 1947.  Relations with 
New Delhi, embittered by claims to Kashmir, worsened as a result 
of India’s role in East Pakistan’s rebirth as Bangladesh in 1971.  
Military rule followed General Zia ul-Haq’s 1977 coup that toppled 
Prime Minister Ali Bhutto.  After Zia’s death in 1988, Benazir 
Bhutto, daughter of the former prime minister, became the first 
woman elected to lead a Muslim nation.  She restored civil rights 
but was plagued by problems: continuing tension and a presumed 
nuclear arms rivalry with India; 3.5 million refugees from the war in 
neighboring Afghanistan; and a growing trade in heroin. 
Agriculture is concentrated in the extensively irrigated Indus 
Basin.  Although internationally financed projects have boosted 
cotton, wheat, and rice production during the past decade, feeding 
the burgeoning population is a constant challenge. 
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Area Total: 803,940 sq. km 
Land: 778,720 sq. km 
Water: 25,220 sq. km 
Climate Mostly hot, dry desert; 
temperate in northwest; arctic 
in north 
Terrain Indus plain in east; mountains 
in north and northwest; 
Balochistan plateau in west 
Natural Resources Land, extensive natural gas 
reserves, limited petroleum, 
poor quality coal, iron ore, 
copper, salt, limestone 
Population 141,553,775 (July 2000 est.) 
Ethnic Groups Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashtun 
(Pathan), Baloch, Muhajir  
Languages Punjabi 48%, Sindhi 12%, 
Siraiki (a Punjabi variant) 10%, 
Pashtu 8%, Urdu (official) 8%, 
Balochi 3%, Hindko 2%, 
Brahui 1%, other 8% 
Legal System Based on English common law 
with provisions to 
accommodate Pakistan’s 
status as an Islamic state 
 
B.  Economy 
Pakistan continues to suffer through a damaging foreign 
exchange crisis, stemming from years of loose fiscal policies that 
have exacerbated inflation and allowed public debt to explode.  
After accruing more than $1.5 billion in debt arrears in the first six 
months of fiscal year 1998-1999, Pakistani officials approached 
multilateral creditors requesting balance-of-payments relief and 
structural support.  In January 1999, Islamabad received more than 
$1 billion in loans along with $3 billion in debt relief following the 
Finance Minister Dar’s pledge to implement an economic reform 
program to reduce the budget deficit, deepen the financial sector, 
and broaden the industrial base. 
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GDP Purchasing Power $282 billion (1999 est.) 
GDP Real Growth Rate 3.1% (1999 est.) 
GDP Per Capita Purchasing 
Power Parity 
$2,000 (1999 est.) 
Population Below Poverty 
Line 
34% (1991 est.) 
Labor Force 38.6 million (1999) 
Industrial Production Growth 
Rate 
3.8% (1999 est.) 
Exports $8.4 billion (F.O.B., 1999) 
Imports $9.8 billion (F.O.B., 1999) 
External Debt $32 billion (1999 est.) 
 
